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Administrative Law - Ashbacker Doctrine
Civil Aeronautics Board
On 8 August 1961, the Civil Aeronautics Board entered an order initiat-
ing an investigation of the United States-Caribbean-South American route
situation.' The order expressed the Board's view that, due to the rapid
growth of foreign air carriers on the route served by petitioners, Braniff
Airways and Pan American-Grace Airways (Panagra), it appeared de-
sirable to extend one of their routes to New York and to eliminate the
other carrier. In response to the order, each of the petitioners filed an
application in 1962 to extend its service to New York. Hearings on these
applications were to be held in the South American Route Case proceed-
ings which were not scheduled to commence before January 1965.
In 1964, pursuant to a bilateral executive agreement between the United
States and Germany,3 Lufthansa Airways filed an application to have its
foreign air carrier permit amended to authorize operations beyond New
York to points in the Caribbean and South America.' Lufthansa's applica-
tion was set for hearing on 17 June 1964. The CAB granted petitioners
leave to intervene. Braniff, supported by Panagra, filed a motion requesting
that Lufthansa's application be consolidated with the pending route case
or that proceedings on Lufthansa's application be deferred until a decision
had been rendered in the case. Petitioners argued that Lufthansa, Braniff,
and other United States carriers were competing applicants for the same
route authorization, and that a prior grant of Lufthansa's application
would preclude a grant of their applications because they were mutually
exclusive as a matter of economics. The CAB denied the motion, and
Braniff and Panagra filed a petition for review. Held: Petitioners were not
entitled to a consolidated hearing, thus the order was interlocutory and
non-reviewable. Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 342 F.2d 905
(D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965).
'United States-Caribbean-South American Investigation, CAB Docket No. 12895.
' Ibid.
'Air Transport Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1955, 7 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. 527, T.I.A.S. No. 3536. The agreement together with the agreed route schedule secured three
reciprocal air routes for each party. The route in issue was granted to Germany and was via inter-
mediate points to Boston, New York, and Philadelphia and beyond to points in the Caribbean and
beyond to South America.4 CAB Docket No. 15073 (10 Mar. 1964).
5 CAB Order No. E-20794 (6 May 1964).
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Generally, the consolidation of proceedings is considered a matter for
administrative rather than judicial judgment.! When the courts interfere
with administrative judgment on the consolidation question, they do so
under the authority of Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC.' In Ashbacker the
Fetzer Broadcasting Company had filed an application for authority to
change its operating frequency to 1230 kilocycles and Ashbacker Radio
Corporation had filed an application for authority to construct a broad-
casting station which would operate on the same frequency. The Com-
mission granted Fetzer's application and the same day set Ashbacker's
application for hearing.! Each applicant had a statutory right to a hearing
before its application was denied.' In reversing the FCC's action the
Supreme Court stated:
Congress has granted applicants a right to a hearing on their applications for
station licenses. Whether that is wise policy or whether the procedure adopted
by the Commission in this case is preferable is not for us to decide. We only
hold that where two bona fide applications are mutually exclusive the grant
of one without a hearing to both deprives the loser of the opportunity which
Congress chose to give him."°
It should be noted that the Commission had found that, due to the geo-
graphical locations of Fetzer's station and Ashbacker's proposed station,
their simultaneous operation on the same frequency would result in "in-
tolerable interference" to both."
Although originating in the communications field, the Ashbacker doc-
trine that parties filing mutually exclusive applications are entitled to
comparative hearings has been applied to other federal agencies including
the CAB." The CAB may, upon an applicant's motion or its own initiative,
consolidate two or more proceedings for hearing if such consolidation will
be conducive to the proper dispatch of its business and to the ends of
justice and will not unduly delay the proceedings." It appears that if a
carrier wishes to assert a valid claim under the Ashbacker doctrine, it
must establish: that the applications involve substantially the same or
related issues; that consolidation will be conducive to the proper dispatch
of the Board's business and to ends of justice; that consolidation will not
unduly delay the proceedings; and, that the statutory guide, public con-
'FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 8.12 (1958). In Pottsville, the Court upheld a FCC order which set three rival applica-
tions for a comparative hearing.
'326 U.S. 327 (1945).
'Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 328 (1945).
9FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT § 309(a), 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964).
The FCC contended that Ashbacker had not been deprived of its right to a hearing because it would
have ample opportunity to show that its proposed operation would serve the public interest better
than Fetzer's operation. The Court met this argument by stating: "if the grant of one [application]
effectively precludes the other, the statutory right to a hearing which Congress has accorded appli-
cants before denial of their applications becomes an. empty thing. We think that is the case here."
326 U.S. at 330.
'°Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945).
11 Id. at 331. The FCC, in its notice of hearing on Ashbacker's application, referred to the hear-
ing as though it was considered a hearing for the revocation of an established license.
" Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In its final order, the CAB
stated that it was in the public interest to limit the number of carriers to operate on the route in
issue.
1314 C.F.R. § 302.12(a) (1965).
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venience and necessity, requires the CAB to limit the number of carriers on
the route in question. If an applicant's motion to consolidate is denied by
the Board, there is usually an appeal directly from the consolidation order.
On appeal, in order to sustain their allegations of mutual exclusivity, the
applicants have attempted to equate the economic factors which the CAB
must consider before a certificate can be issued with the "intolerable inter-
ference" in Ashbac/zer. Generally, the courts have held that the Board's
order was interlocutory and have dismissed the petitions for review for lack
of jurisdiction." The courts have refused to review an order denying con-
solidation in the following instances: where the petitioner sought con-
solidation of an application for a certificate with a proceeding pending
before the Board for approval of a merger; 5 where it was possible for the
Board to reach any one of three justifiable results;"6 and, where consolida-
tion would transform an area proceeding into one involving a trans-
continental route pattern. 7
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, s the court established a choice of pro-
cedures which the CAB could follow when two applications are alleged
to be mutually exclusive." However, National Airlines, Inc. v. CAB"°
limited the procedures established in Delta to the facts of that case. In the
National case, the Board denied a motion to consolidate, but agreed to
give National a full opportunity to establish the "mutually exclusive"
issue on the record in the proceedings. The court held that the Board's
action constituted a fair and substantial compliance with the Ashbacker
doctrine."
In the present case Lufthansa's application for a foreign air carrier per-
mit was filed under section 402 of the Federal Aviation Act." Section 402
empowers the CAB to issue such a permit if it finds, inter alia, that it will
be in the "public interest." However, the Board is not the final arbiter in
such cases, because section 801" provides that the Board's decision with
respect to an application filed under section 402 "shall be subject to the
approval of the President." The petitioners' applications were filed pur-
suant to section 401' which authorizes the Board to issue a certificate;
" In dismissing for lack of jurisdiction to review, the courts consider the merits of a petitioner's
contention. Once the courts decide that he is not entitled to an Ashbacker hearing, the order is
considered interlocutory, because it is not dispositive of any rights.
"5 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950); Seaboard & W. Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 181 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
'6 United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 247 F.2d 562 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 243 F.2d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
"s228 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
"9The choice of procedures established was (1) set for hearing and thereupon decide the issue
of exclusivity as a separate preliminary issue; (2) proceed to a comparative hearing upon the two
applications without further ado; or (3) set for hearing and thereafter decide the merits of the two
applications and also the issue of exclusivity.
2°249 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
"' Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, supra note 7.
"FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, 5 402, 72 Stat. 757 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1964).
"
3
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, 5 801, 72 Stat. 782 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964). See
also Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Alaska Airlines,
Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963); British Overseas Airways
Corp. v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
"
4
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 401, 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1964).
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authorizing air transportation if it finds "that such transportation is re-
quired by the public convenience and necessity." Petitioners contended
that they were entitled to an Ashbacker hearing, because the Board must
consider the same factors in determining the "public interest" as it con-
siders in determining "public converience and necessity." In response to
petitioners' contention, Judge Fahy stated:
We cannot carry the use of phraseology of similar character in the two
sections to the point of overcoming the fact that the public interest involved
in our obligations under the bilateral Agreement cannot be equated with the
public convenience and necessity referred to in Section 401.'
Recognizing that the factors which :ire considered in cases under section
401 are primarily economic, the court was of the opinion that a compara-
tive consideration would have little effect on the Board's decision regarding
Lufthansa's application."6 The court considered the CAB as an agent of
the United States because of the connection between sections 402 and 801
and felt that the Board's obligation with regard to Lufthansa's applica-
tion involved "presidential consideration of our international relations with
Germany as they arise with respect both to Lufthansa and American
domestic carriers operating abroad." 7 The court reasoned that perhaps the
most important public interest factor in Lufthansa's application was the
policy and obligations of the United States as set forth in the bilateral
agreements." Without reaching the issue of mutual exclusivity, the court
held petitioners were not entitled to an Ashbacker hearing because "quite
different considerations bear upon Lufthansa's application and those of
petitioners in the Route Case.""
Although the courts have held that the Ashback-er doctrine applies to
the CAB, they have failed to establish a set procedure for the Board to
follow when two or more applications are alleged to be mutually ex-
clusive." In Ashbacker, the applications were mutually exclusive because
it was physically impossible for both stations to operate on the same fre-
quency and the FCC had made a finding to that effect. However, the
CAB considers various economic factors in determining if a certification
of public convenience and necessity should be issued"' and the fact of
physical impossibility is not present. Also, the CAB may issue an order
denying consolidation without making a finding on the issue of mutual
exclusivity;2 and, if the courts rule that two or more applications are
2 343 F.2d at 909.
26 Id.
27342 F.2d at 908-09.
28342 F.2d at 909.
29342 F.2d at 908.
3°See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text.
3aFEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964). The
following are among the economic factors which the CAB considers:
(1) the sufficiency of traffic; (2) the requirements of the communities; (3) the need for a
proper competitive balance among the various carriers; (4) the need for strong development
forces in certain situations.
aADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT § 6, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(d) (1964).
The CAB may deny a motion to consolidate on grounds other than mutual exclusivity if the
notice of denial is accompanied by a simple statement of the other grounds.
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mutually exclusive before the CAB makes a finding on the issue, they are
performing an administrative function. Perhaps the courts should follow
the National case where the alleged "mutually exclusive" applications are
both filed under section 401. If the Board denies a motion to consolidate,
it should grant the party leave to intervene and provide a fair opportunity
for the party to attempt to establish on the record that the applications
are mutually exclusive. Assuming this procedure is followed and the Board
finds that the applications are mutually exclusive, the applications must
be given comparative consideration. 3 In the event the Board finds that the
applications are not mutually exclusive and grants one of the applications
but denies the other, the party may then appeal the Board's final order.
If the Board's findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the court
can remand and order comparative consideration. By following this pro-
cedure full advantage may be taken of the CAB's expertise, and there
should be substantial compliance with the Ashbacker doctrine.
The question remains whether the Ashbacker doctrine should have been
applicable in the present case. The issues in the petitioners' applications
were economic, while the controlling issue in Lufthansa's application was
the international commitment to Germany. The issues to be considered
in the two applications were not interrelated; on the contrary, they were
diverse. Further, section 1102 of the Federal Aviation Act' requires the
Board to act consistently with any obligation assumed by the United
States in a bilateral agreement. It is possible that a consolidation with the
South American Route Case would have unduly broadened the scope of
the proceeding on Lufthansa's application, and the CAB is to handle such
applications in an expedient manner. However, assuming Ashbacker should
have been applicable in the present case, it is doubtful that a consolidated
hearing would have benefited the domestic carrier. In the event all the
evidence supported a grant of the domestic carrier's application, the Board
could have conceivably issued a permit to the foreign air carrier (the
Board's action would have been consistent with the bilateral agreement),
and the domestic carrier could not have obtained judicial review of the
order because it would have been subject to presidential approval." In cases
such as the present one, perhaps a domestic carrier can adequately protect
its interest through intervention. As an intervenor the carrier would be-
come a party to the hearing on the foreign air carrier's application and
could introduce evidence in support of its position. If the Board is of the
" The most effective means of comparing two applications is a consolidated hearing - a hear-
ing embracing two or more applications. Such a hearing is certain to comply with Ashbacker.
However, the Ashbacker decision suggests that a comparative hearing is also sufficient as long as
final action has not been taken on one of the alleged mutually exclusive applications. In a com-
parative hearing the merits of one or more applications are compared with the merits of one or
more applications considered in another hearing.
4
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 1102, 72 Stat. 797 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1964).
The CAB's construction of the section is that it is not required to recommend issuance of a
foreign carrier's permit to the President merely because there is a bilateral agreement providing
for such permit. In making its recommendation to the President, the CAB weighs the injurious
affect on domestic carriers against the reciprocity benefits of the agreement.
"8FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 1006(a), 72 Star. 795 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a)
1964. See also Note, 32 J. AIR L. & Com. 127 (1966).
1966]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
opinion that the domestic carrier's evidence compels a denial of the foreign
air carrier's permit, it will make such a recommendation to the President."0
Although the President might rely to a great extent on the CAB's recom-
mendation, he must decide the ultimate issue, which is whether it is in the
best interest of the United States to repudiate the bilateral agreement with
Germany, and his decision is not subject to judicial review.
Rodney D. Moore
a6See note 34 supra.
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Torts - Manufacturers' Liability - Continuing Duty
A Linea Aeropostal Venezolano Super Constellation left Idlewild (John
F. Kennedy) Airport on 20 June 1956 for a scheduled non-stop flight
to Maiquetia, Venezuela. Engine trouble developed and the pilot radioed
the airport that he was returning with engine number two "off." Just off
the coast of New Jersey the pilot asked for and obtained permission to
dump fuel to lighten the load. Shortly thereafter the plane burst into
flames and veered sharply into the sea, exploding upon impact. There
were no survivors. The personal representatives of one of the passengers
brought suit in admiralty under the Death on the High Seas Act,1 alleging
negligence by the manufacturer of the plane's propellers. Held: The
evidence established that the malfunction of the propeller was the proxi-
mate cause of the crash, and there was a continuing duty upon the manu-
facturer to develop an improvement of its propeller systems which did
not end with the delivery of the aircraft to the air carrier. Noel v. United
Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).'
In determining the liability of a manufacturer, the principles of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick' are applicable in admiralty as well as common law
suits.4 Generally, a manufacturer is liable for bodily injury to those whom
he should reasonably expect to use his product or be in the vicinity of its
probable use, if he (1) knows or should have known that the object is
likely to cause harm to them if it is used for the purposes for which it is
manufactured, (2) has no reason to believe that they will realize its dan-
gerous condition, and (3) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them
of its dangerous condition.' The degree of care which the manufacturer
must exercise is commensurate with the foreseeable risk of harm to others.'
The obligation to exercise reasonable care is imposed not only in the actual
'41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1964):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or
the District of Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the
personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district
courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or cor-
poration which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
2 For related proceedings, see: Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962)
(No action for breach of warranty under Death on the High Seas Act); 202 F. Supp. 556 (D.
Del. 1962) (Action maintainable exclusively under the Death on the High Seas Act); 191 F.
Supp. 557 (D. Del. 1961) (On implied breach of warranty, Venezuelan law held controlling).
3 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), MacPherson abolished the requirement of privity of
contract in actions based on negligence of a manufacturer.
' Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co., 149 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
'RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 388 (1934).
6 See, e.g., Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. The S.S. Robert Luckenbach, 184 F. Supp. 134 (D. Ore.
1960); Irelan-Yuba Gold Quartz Mining Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 577, 116 P.2d
611 (1941). As the district court stated, "the important considerations involve (1) the recogniz-
able or foreseeable risk, (2) the degree of danger involved and (3) whether . . . [the plaintiff]
was within the ambit of the protection of the duty imposed." Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219
F. Supp. 556, 568 (D. Del. 1963).
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manufacture of the product, but also in the subsequent "duty to warn"
which has been imposed in numerous situations. The duty arises both
where a defect is known to exist,7 and in certain cases in which there is in-
sufficient or no evidence of any defective construction or improper design.'
Where some risk' is involved in the reasonable, foreseeable use" of the
product, the duty is imposed upon the manufacturer to adequately warn"
those whom he reasonably expects to use his product."i However, a manu-
facturer is not under a duty to warn of product dangers which are ob-
vious or of which the user has or should have actual knowledge,"3 nor is
he required to warn of dangers which he could not have discovered by
reasonable inspection." As part of his duty to warn, the manufacturer is
now generally required to "keep reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge
and discoveries concerning his field and is deemed to possess whatever
knowledge is thereby imparted."'" He is required to conduct reasonable
tests and inspections to discover latent dangers." This duty to test and
to warn of danger does not terminate upon sale or distribution of the
product, but the duty is a continuing one. This "continuing duty" is
described in Comstock v. General Motors Corp.:'
The duty of the manufacturer to warn of a known danger in the product
exists not only at the point of sale, but also exists where a latent defect
hazardous to life becomes known to, the manufacturer shortly after the
product has been put on the market.8
This special duty, then, is generally limited to situations where a "latent
defect hazardous to life" is discovered."
'See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168
(1964); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961), where the court, applying
California law, held the manufacturer liable for failure to warn of a known defect, even though
the defective component was supplied to it by another.
s See, e.g., Tamao v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954), where the manu-
facturer was held liable for failure to warn that a grinding wheel would disintegrate when operated
above a certain speed; DeVito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). See
generally 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY 143-48.3 (1964).
' The risk must be more than merely trivial. It is generally concluded that a reasonable proba-
bility of injury must exist. Katz v. Arundel-Brooaks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731
(1959).
"Martin v. Bengue, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626, 632 (1957): "While the manufacturer
of a product is not an insurer of its safety, he is under a duty of care to avoid all unreasonable
risks of harm from its use. When such risks are foreseeable, he must take reasonable precautions to
avoid them." See also Comstock v. General Motois Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959),
Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 460 (1961).
" The warning must be appropriate and adequate to appraise the user of potential danger. Tampa
Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958), Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 778 (1961). See generally 1
HURsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 2.40-.44 (1961).
" Tamao v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, Inc., supra note 8; see generally 1 HURSH, op. cit., supra
note 11, at § 2.34-37.
31d. at § 2.37-39.
'"See, e.g., Pabon v. Hackensack Auto Sales, Inc., 63 N.J. Super. 476, 164 A.2d 773 (App.
Div. 1963); Livesley v. Continental Motors Corp., 331 Mich. 434, 49 N.W.2d 365 (1951).
"See, e.g., Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
'6See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), Hopkins
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 199 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1952); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.
v. United Aircraft Corp., 192 A.2d 913 (Del. Super. Ct. 1963), aff'd, 199 A.2d 758 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1964).
17358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959), Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 460 (1961).
"99 N.W.2d 627, 628 (1959).
"For a general discussion, see Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,
Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43 (1965).
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In the instant case the evidence available to the libellant2 ° was primarily
circumstantial." There were no survivors and the plane wreckage was
mostly irrecoverable. It was agreed by the parties that an overspeed" in
the number two engine23 had developed and that the pilot had decided to
return to New York, since he could not correct it. The airliner was
escorted on the return trip by a United States Coast Guard plane and an
Eastern Air Lines plane. The evidence may be summarized as follows:
(1) Eye-witness reports of the pilots of the escorting aircraft were
given. The Eastern pilot testified that he saw a "white puff" come out
behind the Venezuelan airliner, while the Coast Guard crew testified that
they saw a "blue flame" on the right side of the plane. Shortly thereafter
the plane went down.24
(2) Findings of bodies and airplane seats in the ocean were reported.
Two bodies were found each with a leg severed, but there was conflicting
testimony as to which leg. One of the plane's double seats was found
severed diagonally with traces of orange paint on the seat, orange being
the color of the paint banding on the propeller blades. The bodies and
the seat were recovered three miles from the main scene of the wreckage.
Although the location of the seat within the aircraft could not be ascer-
tained, the bodies were identified as those of a Mrs. DeArmis and her son.
According to the flight plan they were assigned to seat number four,
which was just behind the number two propeller.
(3) Eugene L. Grindle, an expert witness, presented libellant's theory
of the crash, and testified concerning the effect of overspeeds in relation
to an aircraft in flight and the effect of inability to feather' an overspeed-
ing propeller.
(4) Libellant presented exhibits of previously recorded overspeeds and
their effect on airplanes in flight.
Relying on this evidence, libellant advanced a theory which was sub-
stantially adopted by the district court. The court found that the libellant
had established by the preponderance of the evidence that the cause of
20 Libellant was not suing the airline but the manufacturer of the propeller system used on the
aircraft.
21 When direct evidence is unavailable, a plaintiff is free to present circumstantial evidence
upon which reasonable inferences may be based. See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., 190 F.2d
825, 828 (3d Cir. 1951). If the inferences sought are reasonable, the circumstances need not
negative every other possible conclusion. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330
(1960); Wood v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But see Nash v. Raun, 149
F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 758 (1945). The principle limitation is that the
findings should not be a matter of mere speculation or guesswork. McCready v. United Iron &
Steel Co., 272 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1959).
" An overspeed occurs when the propeller turns at a rate beyond the maximum for which it
was designed to rotate. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 6, at 557-58.
22 The number two engine is the left-hand, inboard engine as one faces forward in the aircraft.
Id. at 557 n.1.
' The district court resolved this conflict in testimony by concluding that the Coast Guard
crew was mistaken. In view of the libellant's evidence and the fact that "there was no known, or
strongly suspected, ignition source on the right side of the plane as compared with the number 2
engine on the left side," the court found that the bluish appearance which looked like fire was
the result of some "trick of light." Id. at 565.
22 "To feather means to cause the propeller blades to be turned to a position parallel to the air-
stream so that they will cease to rotate due to pressure of air across the blades. Inability to feather
permits the overspeeding propeller to rotate at an uncontrolled speed." Id. at 558 n.5.
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the accident was a prolonged overspeed and inability to feather the
propeller. This led to a decoupling,6 fire and separation of the propeller.
Upon separation, the propeller sliced through the fuselage dislodging
the seat just behind the propeller" and ejecting the occupants. 8 It then
gashed into the fuel tank located beneath the seats. The flames from the
number two engine were swept back over the wing into the plumes of
gasoline trailing from the dump chutes, igniting them. 9 The court con-
cluded: "The flames from the explosion added to and increased the holo-
caust resulting in the total loss of the plane.""a The United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the district court's findings of
fact were not "clearly erroneous,"'" but were substantiated by the record."
Along with the trial court, the Third Circuit recognized that the duty to
warn continued after the sale of the product; but both courts proceeded
further, imposing a continuing duty to develop improvements to eliminate
or minimize the danger. Such a duty, after the sale of the product, has
been suggested"' and impliedly rejected,' but both courts here met the
issue directly, establishing the duty, with attendant conditions. This con-
clusion was based upon the following facts: (1) the manufacturer "was
aware that, absent some type of control mechanism, continued use of its
propeller systems on a particular aircraft endangered the public," and (2)
despite this awareness, the manufacturer allowed the development of
effective safety devices adaptable to these planes to fall behind similar
programs for other aircraft." The libellant, submitting records of pre-
vious instances of overspeeds followed by decoupling involving the same
propeller system, and presenting the testimony of expert witnesses, estab-
lished United's awareness of the urgent need for a safety device. Such a
device, "pitch lock,"' was available, had been certified by the Civil Aero-
nautics Authority, and was manufactured and in actual use on Douglas
aircraft as early as January 1956. No reason was shown for not using
it on the Lockheed Constellation, arid apparently both planes could have
used it. The district court found that United's delay in developing pitch
2A decoupling occurs when the engine crankshaft is separated from the propeller shaft. The
propeller is thereby left spinning free of the aircraft.27 This seat is the one found in the ocean some three miles from the wreckage.
" They were Mrs. DeArmis and her son. The libellant contended that this explained the location
of the bodies three miles from the crash scene because they were ejected before the crash; and the
relatively good state of preservation of the bodies because they were not subject to the added impact
of the crash. The court agreed.
"s Shortly before this sequence of events the pilot, after obtaining permission from the Idlewild
tower, had begun to dump fuel in preparation for the landing in New York.
'°Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556, 566 (D. Del. 1963).
21 In reviewing a judgment of a federal district court sitting without a jury in admiralty, the
reviewing court may not set the judgment aside unless it is "clearly erroneous." McAllister v.
United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954). "A finding i:; clearly erroneous when 'although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed.' " 1I. at 20; United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y,
343 U.S. 326, 339 (1952).
"2Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964).
22Ellis v. H. S. Finke, Inc., 278 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1960).
24 Shapiro v. Remington Arms Co., 259 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1958).
's 342 F.2d at 236.
26 "Pitch lock" detects an overspeed and prevents the blade angle from going to a low pitch by
locking oil in front of the piston. It does not prevent overspeed entirely, but limits it. Noel v.
United Aircraft Corp., supra note 30, at 570.
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lock for use on the existing propeller driven planes was its concentration
on the development of improved systems for the new Electra to come into
service some two years later. Concluding, Judge Layton wrote:
I am forced to the conclusion that United was negligent in that it should
and could have produced pitch lock for use on Constellation type planes prior
to June 20, 1956, and had it done so, the ability of AMS [the call letters
of the Venezuelan airliner] substantially to control overspeed would have
been materially increased.37
As three of the Third Circuit judges noted,3 the continuing duty of
the manufacturer to develop improvements in the safety of his product
not found to have been negligently made is a new and far reaching one.
The majority in Noel have taken an important step, yet they do not
delineate the duty which they impose. As Judge Biggs stated, "[s]uch
an extension of the law of liability requires . . . a full review and dis-
cussion and a hearing before this court en banc."3 It is hoped that in the
future the courts will carefully set out the limits within which the duty
will be imposed. Certain guidelines, however, may be extracted from the
Noel decision which will be helpful. It is clear, as the Third Circuit pointed
out," that a manufacturer need not develop safety devices to protect
against every remotely possible danger.' However, when a manufacturer
is aware of a dangerous defect in his product, has the resources to develop
an effective safety device, and has no reasonable explanation for not at-
tempting to develop such a device, an immediate and continuing duty
arises to "institute a vigorous safety program"4 for its development. Such
a duty continues even after delivery and certification of the product.
The imposition of the duty increases as the danger increases, so that a
manufacturer of airplane parts would have a relatively high duty to
develop safety improvements. Furthermore, when, as in the instant case,
it appears that the manufacturer is the major supplier of that product,
and the industry is particularly dependent upon it for the development
of improved systems,43 the duty is clear. Within these basic guidelines, the
new duty will be a major advance in the field of tort law.
Leo M. Favrot III
3
Id. at 572.
" On petition for rehearing, denied by the majority, Judge Hastie concurred in the opinion,
while Judge Freedman and Judge Biggs dissented. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 240
(3d Cir. 1965).
39 Id. at 244.
"Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 1964).
a" Mitchell v. Machinery Center, Inc., 297 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1962); Marker v. Universal Oil
Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957); Pontifex v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 226 F.2d 909 (4th
Cir. 1955).
'Lambert & Joost, Comments on Recent Important Aviation Cases, 30 NACCA L.J. 380
(1964).
4 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United Aircraft Corp., supra note 16.
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Estate Tax - Flight Accident Insurance - Section 2042
Prior to boarding a flight from New York to Venezuela, Marshal L.
Noel signed applications for two round-trip flight accident insurance
policies, aggregating $125,000, and named his wife as beneficiary. The
policies, dissimilar in minor respects but otherwise in the usual form,
insured against loss of life or specified bodily injury' suffered by the in-
sured as the result of an aircraft accident occurring during any part of
the flight. The airplane crashed and the companies paid Mrs. Noel the
face value of the policies. However, his executors did not include the
proceeds in the estate tax return. The Tax Court found the insurance
payments to be within the decedent's estate.' The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court,a and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' Held, reversed: Flight accident insurance is insurance "on the
life of the decedent." Mr. Noel possessed exercisable "incidents of owner-
ship" in the policies at his death, and the proceeds are therefore includable
in the gross estate. Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U. S. 678 (1965).
I. BACKGROUND
The right to transmit property at death is a right which has been en-
joyed for generations and is an accepted incident of property ownership,
rather than a privilege. However, the government can prescribe the
conditions under which it will permit the transmission of property by
devise or descent upon the owner's death' because the right to take prop-
erty by device or by descent is a legal privilege and not a natural right.6
Death taxes are imposed either on the right of a decedent to transmit
property or on the privilege of an heir or legatee to receive it, with the
federal estate tax being an excise tax of the former type on the right
to transmit property from the dead to the living7 while a state inheritance
tax is of the latter type. The first federal estate tax statute in 1916' did
'The policies provided for the payment of a specified amount for each of several enumerated
injuries and for the payment of the principal sum in the event of accidental death.
Mrs. Noel testified that she paid the premiums on the policies, following which her husband
instructed the sales clerk to give them to her.
'Estate of Marshal L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (19162).
aEstate of Noel v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
"Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 379 U.S. 927 (1964).
'See generally 1 POLISHER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING 52 (2d ed. 1948).
'Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898).
'New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 545 (1921), upheld the constitutionality of the
federal estate tax which is imposed on the transfer or shifting of relationships to property at death.
8 Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756. See also 1 POLISHER, op. cit. supra note 5, at 52. Prior
to the federal estate tax statute of 1916, estate taxes were in the nature of emergency tax legislation
during war periods which was repealed in postwar periods. In 1916, to provide funds for federal
highway construction grants and for American preparedness for World War I, the estate tax, based
on the net estate transmitted by a deceased, was passed. The present federal estate tax has its origin
in this legislation.
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not deal expressly with insurance, but insurance proceeds paid to the de-
cedent's estate could be taxed as property owned by the decendent.' In
the Revenue Act of 1918,'o Congress added a specific provision to tax
insurance receivable by the executor and, also, levied a tax on the proceeds
of insurance policies "taken out by the decedent on his own life," even if
the proceeds were payable to other named beneficiaries. The provision
has been reenacted and exists in basically the same form as it did at its
inception." From 1918 to 1941, the test of inclusion shifted between
ownership of policy and payment of premium with considerable uncer-
tainty as to which represented the better reasoned approach. In late 1941,
the Treasury issued a ruling, incorporated in 1942 into the code, providing
for the taxation of the proceeds of all policies owned by the insured or
paid for by him. 2 The premium payment test was discarded in the 1954
Code. Sections 2031-44 are the current statutory provisions for including
property and interests in the gross estate of a decedent for federal estate
tax purposes." The particular statute pertinent to life insurance is section
2042.4
Leopold Ackerman," a 1929 Board of Tax Appeals decision, is appar-
ently the only prior case dealing with the includability of accident in-
surance death benefits in the gross estate. It was held in Ackerman that
proceeds of double indemnity life insurance policies and payments under
accidental death policies were amounts received "as insurance under poli-
cies taken out by the decedent upon his own life" within section 302(g)
of the Revenue Act of 1924." According to Ackerman, accident insur-
ance providing for unconditional payments in the case of accidental death
is within the insurance concept of the present section 2042 (2), which is
almost identical to section 302 (g) of the 1924 statute. 7
Since Ackerman, it has been settled and consistent administrative prac-
tice to include insurance proceeds from accidental death policies in de-
cedents' estates." The Treasury Regulations have remained unchanged
'Mimnaugh v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 411 (1928), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 563 (1929).
'0 Revenue Act of 1918, § 402 (f), 40 Stat. 1097, 1098. All property was included in the value
of the gross estate "to the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the extent of the excess over $40,000
of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life."
11Revenue Act of 1918, § 402(f), 40 Stat. 1097, 1098; Revenue Act of 1921, § 402(f), 42
Stat. 227, 279; Revenue Act of 1924, § 302(g), 43 Stat. 253, 305; Revenue Act of 1926, 5
302(g), 44 Stat. 9, 71; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 1, 122, as amended by Revenue
Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Stat. 798, 944; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042.
2 Revenue Act of 1942, § 404, 56 Star. 798.
"aINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2031-44.
14 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042. The pertinent provisions of this section are as follows:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property-
(1) Receivable by the executor-to the extent of the amount receivable by the exe-
tor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries-to the extent of the amount receivable by all
other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent with
respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of own-
ership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person.
'515 B.T.A. 635 (1929).
'e Revenue Act of 1924, § 302(g), 43 Stat. 253, 305.
17 See note 11 I supra.
"SCommissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681 (1965).
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from the time of the decision" and Congress has never attempted to limit
the scope of that decision or the established administrative construction of
section 2042 (2)," 9 although it has reenacted the section and amended it
in other respects a number of times. When a long-standing administrative
interpretation continues without change and applies to substantially re-
enacted statutes, courts generally deem the interpretation to have received
congressional approval and the effect of law."
II. COMMISSIONER v. ESTATE OF NOEL
A. Policies On The Life Of Decedent
The Third Circuit's decision that flight accident insurance policies are
not "policies on the life of the decedent" was based on the distinction be-
tween life and accident insurance. The fundamental distinctions between
them are reflected not only in the various reasons for which each is pur-
chased, but also in the inherent differences in the principles of coverage and
underwriting requirements. The most significant difference perhaps, is
the comparison between the measured, inevitable fact of death, and the
highly speculative, evitable, uncertain occurrence of an accident. The like-
lihood of any individual's death can be statistically computed and measured
in dollars and cents. Thus every ordinary life insurance policy has a
discernable value from the moment it is issued. This value gives the in-
sured an immediate and real asset over which he may exercise control.
It is certainty of payment which gives ordinary life insurance its substance
and provides the basis of taxability." In contrast, an accident policy repre-
sents a gamble without substantial economic value. These fundamental
differences, it was argued, require different tax treatment."
Noel's estate contended that taxation would not further the purpose of
the estate tax, i.e., prevention of accumulated wealth from being passed
on, undiminished, from generation to generation.' To justify includability
in a decedent's taxable estate, property of economic value must have been
owned or controlled by the decedent and transferred at his death." The
mere receipt of property by a beneficiary is not sufficient, because the tax
is not upon the receipt of property, but is upon the transfer." According
to the Third Circuit's interpretation, the requisite valuable interest did not
exist in the flight accident insurance policies held by Marshal Noel. Re-
gardless of whether he had the right to change policy beneficiaries, he
1926 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1 (a) (1) (1961); Trcas. Reg. 105 (1939 Code), § 81.25; Treas. Reg.
80, art. 25 (1934 ed. & 1937 ed.); Treas. Reg. 70, art. 25 (1926 ed. & 1929 ed.); Treas. Reg. 68,
art. 25 (1924 ed.); Treas. Reg. 63, art. 27 (1922 ed.); Treas. Reg. 37, art. 32 (1921 ed.).
2'380 U.S. at 681-82.
2 See, e.g., Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 291-92 (1945); Helvering v. Winwill, 305
U.S. 79, 83 (1938); United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933); National
Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U.S. 140, 146 (1920).
2Helvering v. Illinois Life Ins. Co., 299 U.S. 88, 91 (1936).
"Brief for Respondent, pp. 17-18, Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
S4 Id. at 14.
"Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238 (1925).
'4 Walker v. United States, 83 F.2d 103, 110 (8th Cir. 1936).
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retained nothing of value which was properly includable for estate taxa-
tion. The estate looked to the inherently speculative nature of the policies,
the infinitesimal chance of an airplane accident, and the minimal premium
charge to demonstrate the lack of value of decedent's interest in the
policies.
A further aid to the Third Circuit's decision was an analysis of the
legislative history of section 2042 (2), and, more specifically, the phrase
"insurance under policies on life of decedent." Section 2042 (2) does not
mention accident insurance policies, but such analysis sheds considerable
light on congressional intent and interpretation of statutory phrases of
doubtful meaning." As earlier stated, s section 2042 (2) is in essence the
same as Section 402 (f) of the Revenue Act of 1918, the original federal
estate tax enactment concerning life insurance. The Committee on Ways
and Means of the 65th Congress submitted a report stating that payments
to specific beneficiaries "do not fall within the existing provision defining
the gross estate ... that wealthy persons have and now anticipate resorting
to this method of defeating the estate tax . . . for the reason that such
insurance would not be included in the gross estate. 29 On this basis the
Court of Appeals stated that "the obvious intent of Congress and the
purpose of the enactment was to foreclose the possibility of tax avoidance
under the existing law."'" The very uncertainty of accidental death pre-
cludes the use of accident insurance as an estate planning tool or instru-
ment of tax avoidance.
As logical as the Third Circuit's analysis may appear,"5 the more con-
vincing interpretation of legislative intent supports the Supreme Court's
decision. Sections 2033 through 2042 are all-encompassing, reaching every
disposition which is testamentary and subject to a decedent's control.
Section 2042 is only one of a number of provisions defining the gross
estate of a decedent so as to make taxable the full value of any property
controlled by a decedent and received by reason of his death. It performs
an integral role in accomplishing the congressional purpose of taxing the
full value of property transferred by reason of the death of a decedent
who had the power to control the disposition of the property at the time
of his death. As noted in Ackerman," Congress chose the broadest possible
language in the coverage of insurance proceeds in the estate tax when it
stated that "the gross estate shall include the value of all property ...
to the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insur-
ance under policies on the life of the decedent." Income tax provisions
are not controlling for estate tax purposes, but an understanding of them
27 See, e.g., Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943); United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534-44 (1940); Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143
U.S. 457 (1892); J. C. Penney Co. v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1962); City of
Newark v. United States, 254 F.2d 93, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1958).
28 See text accompanying note 11 supra.
2 9H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1918).
'0 Estate of Noel v. Commissioner, supra note 3, at 953.
as The House Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1918, the only relevant item of legis-
lative history, is inconclusive on the precise question of accidental death benefits, because there is
no indication that Congress ever considered the question.
" Leopold Ackerman, supra note 15, at 638.
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can help in construing the insurance provisions of the estate tax.3 Section
101 excludes from gross income death benefits paid "under a life insur-
ance contract."3 ' This section evolved from the first income tax act passed
after the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution and is essentially the
same today as when originally enacted."5 Section 1.101-1 (a) of the Trea-
sury Regulations on Income Tax provides that "Death benefit payments
having the characteristics of life insurance proceeds payable by reason
of death under contracts, such as . . . accident and health insurance con-
tracts, are covered by this provision." ' It appears that Congress has in-
tended a broad definition of the term "life insurance" in this strictly
defined section, and quite possibly a more restricted interpretation was
never intended by Congress when enacting section 2042.
The Supreme Court expressed 7 its awareness that the Board of Tax
Appeals had recognized the distinction between life insurance and accident
insurance when the Board held that they should be treated similarly. The
broad language of section 2042 makes no such distinction and is not in-
consistent with the decision in Ackerman." Relying on the presumption
that a long-standing administrative interpretation applicable to a sub-
stantially reenacted statute has received congressional approval and has
the effect of law,"' the Supreme Court felt itself bound to follow Acker-
man and held that insurance policies, whether called "flight accident in-
3 See, e.g., United States v. Suplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1924). The
Supreme Court compared income tax § 213 with estate tax § 402, both of which pertain to in-
surance. As life insurance was already subject to the estate tax, there ,would be double taxation if
it were subject to the income tax. The Court held that Congress did not intend such a result.
'
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954:
Section 101: CERTAIN DEATH BENEFITS
(a) Proceeds of life Insurance Contracts Payable by Reason of Death.
(1) General Rule-Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2) and in sub-
section (d), gross income does not include amounts received (whether in a
single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such amounts
are paid by reason of the death of the insured.
3' This original act provided that the proceeds of life insurance policies would not be included
as income, 38 Stat. 167 (1913). Revenue Act of 1916, § 4, 39 Star. 756, 758; Revenue Act of
1918, § 213(b) (1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065; Revenue Act of 1921, § 213(b) (1), 42 Star. 227, 238;
Revenue Act of 1924, § 213(b) (1), 43 Stat. 253, 267; Revenue Act of 1926, § 213(b) (1), 44
Star. 9, 24; Revenue Act of 1928, § 22(b) (1), 45 Stat. 791, 797; Revenue Act of 1932, 5
22(b) (1), 47 Stat. 169, 178; Revenue Act of 1934, § 22(b)(1), 48 Stat. 680, 687; Revenue Act
of 1936, § 22(b)(1), 49 Stat. 1648, 1657; Revenue Act of 1938, § 22(b)(1), 52 Stat. 447, 458;
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22(b) (1), 53 Stat. 1, 10.
3 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1 (1961).
3'380 U.S. at 681.
" Leopold Ackerman, supra note 15, at 637. This distinction did not affect the Ackerman de-
cision because the Board of Tax Appeals stated "we fail to see why one [type of policy] is not taken
out upon the life of the policyholder as much as the other. In each case the risk assumed by the
insurer is the loss of the insured's life, and the payment of the insurance money is contingent upon
the loss of life."
3 See authority cited note 21 supra. It should be pointed out that attaching significance to con-
gressional silence is normally an unrealistic canon of construction. It has been held that reenactment
of a statute after interpretation by the Board of Tax Appeals is an unreliable indicum of con-
gressional satisfaction with the interpretation, particularly in the absence of an affirmative indication
that Congress was aware of the interpretation. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955); Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939); Hoshland v. Helvering, 298
U.S. 441 (1936). It is difficult to argue that existing interpretations of tax statutes are incorporated
by reenactment, because the numerous sources of interpretation in this field belie the theory
that Congress was aware of them in passing a reenactment. See HART & SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS
1401-02 (tent. ed. 1958).
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surance" or "life insurance," were in effect insurance taken out on the
life of the decedent within the meaning of section 2042 (2).4°
B. Incidents Of Ownership
The Tax Court found that the policy provision' reserving to the in-
sured the right to change beneficiary was an incident of ownership which
brought the policies within the provisions of section 2042 (2) .4 The
Court of Appeals agreed that the right amounted to an exercisable inci-
dent of ownership, but reversed the Tax Court because it did not believe
flight accident insurance came within the meaning of the statute.' The
Supreme Court agreed with both in holding that retention of the right
to change beneficiary was sufficient to meet the statutory requirement."
There is considerable authority to the effect that retention of the right
to change beneficiaries is an incident of ownership sufficient in itself to
bring the policy proceeds into a decedent's gross estate.' To free pro-
ceeds from estate taxes, the insured must divest himself of all rights and
powers in the insurance policies. The Supreme Court expressly stated that
nothing they said should be taken to mean that a policyholder is without
power to divest himself of all, incidents of ownership by a valid gift
or assignment,"6 so as to bar the inclusion of policy proceeds in his gross
estate under section 2042." Ordinarily, in the absence of statutory or
contractual prohibition, an insurance policy can be assigned, and the usual
rules of assignment as to the requisites, validity, operation, and effect of
assignment, will apply. ' An assignment is usually valid when the inten-
tion to pass an interest in the policy to the assignee is manifested in writ-
ing, and the writing need not be attached to, or written on, the policy. 9
However, the questions of whether an insured has the right to make an
assignment and whether a valid and effective assignment has been made
must be determined under local law."° Occasionally, the result may turn
on which local law controls, and since insurance policies are contracts,
o380 U.S. at 682.
4' In each policy there is a paragraph as follows: "CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY: The right to
change of beneficiary is reserved to the insured and the consent of the beneficiary shall not be
requisite to surrender or assignment of this policy or to any change of beneficiary or beneficiaries,
or to any changes in this policy."
42 Estate of Marshal L. Noel, supra note 2, at 471.
" Estate of Noel v. Commissioner, supra note 3, at 954.
4' 380 U.S. at 684.
" See, e.g., Farwell v. United States, in which the insured made proceeds payable to an irrevoca-
ble inter vivos trust. The court held that retention of right to change beneficiary was an incident
of ownership. 243 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1957). Retention of the right to change a contingent bene-
ficiary, despite the fact that the primary beneficiary was designated irrevocably with ownership
rights, was considered an incident of ownership in Broderick v. Keefe, 112 F.2d 293 (1st Cir.),
appeal dismissed per stipulation, 311 U.S. 721 (1940). Proceeds of life insurance were included in
insured's gross estate, although insured's mother took out the policies, paid the premium, and re-
tained possession, because insured retained the right to change beneficiary, an incident of ownership
in Michael Collino, 25 T.C. 1026 (1956).
4' Assignment forms are provided by flight insurance companies to allow an insured to transfer
his right to change beneficiary.
47 380 U.S. at 684.
48 See generally 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 410 (1946).
49 ld. § 423.
s See, e.g., Louis J. Dorson, 4 T.C. 463 (1944); Anna Rosenstock, 41 B.T.A. 635 (1940).
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the conflict of laws rules applicable to contracts will govern the choice
of law."
One question before the courts was whether Noel's practical inability
to exercise his right to change beneficiary was sufficient to make the power
illusory and not an appropriate incident of ownership to satisfy section
2042. Noel's estate argued that he possessed an empty power which could
not be exercised once he entered the airplane. If Congress had intended
to tax all incidents of ownership regardless of the practical substance,
it would not have written section 2042 (2) so as to condition taxability
on whether the incident of ownership is exercisable." The term "incidents
of ownership" is not limited in its meaning to ownership of the policy
in the technical legal sense, but generally refers to the right of the in-
sured to the economic benefits of the policy. 3 The estate contended that
exercisable incidents of ownership within the meaning of the statute must
be substantial and significant, and riot empty, illusory, and valueless if
the proceeds are to be includable for tax purposes. 4 A further argument
was that the provision concerning change of beneficiary was merely
"boiler plate," that decedent did not desire the right, and that he could
not have obtained the policies without the provision. Courts have gone
behind printed forms to determine if a decedent really had such rights. "
The Tax Court" felt it was immaterial that the right to change the bene-
ficiary was "boiler plate," because it was part of the contractual rela-
tionship with each insurance company, and defined a legal right of the
decedent. The statute, accordingly, was applicable because the right to
change beneficiaries is one of the recognized "incidents of ownership."'"
As the Tax Court's decision"8 was followed by the Supreme Court in
Noel, it is now firmly established that the practical ability to exercise the
right to change beneficiary at any moment is immaterial when determin-
ing if the insured had the particular incidents of ownership at the time
of his death within the provisions of section 2042 (2) .Y
III. CONCLUSION
The treatment of life insurance proceeds payable to a named beneficiary
" Louise C. Moore, 33 B.T.A. 108 (1935). The court held that the law of the state in which
the contract was "made" should govern unless the contract specified otherwise. Here, the policies
were issued in New York. "Made" seems to mean where the policy was sold.
" The condition pertains to insurance "with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death
any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable eithcr alone or in conjunction with any other person."
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042(2).
"SSee Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1950); S. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 235 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1954); 26 C.F.R.
§ 2042-1 (c) (2).
5" Brief for Respondent, p. 19, Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 US.. 678 (1965).
"SSee, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wilson, 216 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Schongalla v.
Hickey, 149 F.2d 687 (2d Cit. 1945); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87 F. Supp.
773 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Edward Doerken, 46 B.T.A. 809 (1942).
'" Estate of Marshal L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466, 471 (1962).
" 380 U.S. at 684.
S"The Noel case followed the principle of Rev. Rul. 61-123, 1961-2 CuM. BULL. 151, which
considered a similar situation in holding the insured's inability to exercise his right to change bene-
ficiary at any particular time as immaterial, and that the insured possessed an incident of ownership.
s" The Supreme Court stated that "it would stretch the imagination to think that Congress
intended to measure estate tax liability by an individual's fluctuating, day-by-day, hour-by-hour
capacity to dispose of property which he owns." 380 U.S. at 684.
[Vol. 32
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
other than the estate of the insured presents a major problem of tax
policy. Two principal competing forces exist in this area. There is a
congressional desire to encourage the use of insurance as a means of
providing for surviving dependents. Insurance payments, being similar
to testamentary dispositions, require the imposition of a tax. The testa-
mentary nature of insurance arrangements at the present time is sub-
stantially ignored in favor of a broad exclusionary policy that often
leaves insurance proceeds outside the gross estate."0 The single test pro-
vided by section 2042(2) for determining whether amounts receivable
by beneficiaries other than the estate are includable in the gross estate is
whether the decedent possessed any of the incidents of ownership at the
time of his death. Noel firmly establishes that section 2042 covers death
payments under accident insurance policies "as insurance under policies
on the life of the decedent."
The federal courts have determined what the term "insurance" en-
compasses as used in federal estate taxation. 1 In a leading case," the
Supreme Court stated that Congress identified the characteristics of life
insurance as involving the essential elements of risk-shifting and risk-
distributing. It can be assumed that Congress intended amounts received
pursuant to a transaction having these features as within the meaning of
insurance in the statute.63 It can also be concluded that payments under
contracts that are not insurance contracts, but having the same character-
istics, are to be included in the decedent's gross estate under section 2042.4
The courts will look to the substance of an insurance policy and will con-
sider the title or description of the agreement as unimportant so long as
life insurance elements are present.
It is apparent that ordinary life insurance, unlike limited purpose flight
accident insurance, has a significant savings aspect, so that proceeds of
such insurance may represent property accumulated by the insured dur-
ing his lifetime. The possibilities of tax avoidance through investing
accumulated property in ordinary life insurance are greater. The difference
between the insured's contribution and the policy proceeds will be greater
when the policy insures against death from only a limited number of
causes or for only a limited time. Ordinary life insurance is at one extreme
with accident insurance as in Noel at the other, and term insurance com-
ing between them. The variance in degree of risk, in difference between
premiums paid, and in benefits realized, is irrelevant for the purposes of
the statute. Estate tax policy, as determined in Noel, considers these dis-
60 STEPHENS & MARR, THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX 153 (1959).
65 Kernochan v. United States, 29 F. Supp. 860 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 675 (1939).
62Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941).
6" See Estate of Keller v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 543 (1941); Helvering v. Le Gierse, 312 U.S.
531 (1941); Leopold Ackerman, supra note 15.
64 Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Estate of Strauss
v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 853 (1950). Payments from a fund were made to the family of a de-
ceased member of the New York Stock Exchange.
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tinctions unimportant. The court will treat insurance policies in an eco-
nomic rather than legal sense with death benefit payment provisions of
accident insurance policies being treated as ordinary life insurance."
Accordingly, insurance on the life of a decedent will be interpreted broadly
so as to include all death benefit payments in all varieties of insurance
policies.
Though not mentioned by the courts in Noel, if the proceeds of life
insurance are not includable in the gross estate under section 2042, they
may be included under some other provision of the estate tax, depending
upon the facts of the particular case. Where a decedent possessed inci-
dents of ownership in an insurance policy on his life but gratuitously
transferred all rights in the policy "in contemplation of death,"" section
2035 might apply." The mere fact that the property involved in the
transfer is life insurance does not of itself mean the transfer was in con-
templation of death." However, the regulations state that any transfer of
an interest in property or relinquishment of a power within a period of
three years ending with the date of death is presumed to have been made
"in contemplation of death," unless the contrary is shown." The Internal
Revenue Service has indicated it will take the position that where the
incidents of ownership in an air travel insurance policy are assigned by
the insured to a related person, the insured has made a gift "'in contem-
plation of death" and the proceeds will be included in the gross estate for
federal estate tax purposes." It is difficult to see how Noel's executors
could successfully argue that the transfer was not made in contemplation
of death.
In light of the past history of the estate tax provisions concerning the
taxability of life insurance, it is quite possible the law is merely a temporary
sanctuary for estate planners, and that other tests for determining the
incidence of the estate tax may be established in the not too distant
future. The "constitutional shadow" which once hung over the old pay-
6 Respondent argued that amounts recoverable by beneficiaries from workmen's compensation
death benefits, Rev. Rul. 56-637, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 600; or under wrongful death statutes, Rev.
Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 CuM. BULL. 179; or as social security death benefits, ET 18, 1940-2 CuM.
BULL. 285; and Armed Forces Gratuity Pay, Rev. Rul. 55-581, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 381, were not
taxable and that the reasons for their exclusion should apply here.
"'United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102 (1931), is the principal guide to the meaning of the
phrase in connection with § 2035 of the 1954 Code. For the statute to apply, the Court said it
is enough that contemplation of death was the inducing cause of the transfer, but it need not be
the sole inducing cause of the transfer. It may Ibe enough that thoughts of death played a sub-
stantial part inducing the transfer.
6726 C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(a)(2) (1961).
"' Cronin's Estate v. Commissioner, 164 F.2d 561 (6th Cir. 1947).
69 26 C.F.R. § 20.2035-1 (d) (1961). An irrevocable assignment of a policy leaving no incident
of ownership in the decedent but made in contemplation of death will not take the proceeds of the
policy out of his estate. Garrett's Estate v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1950); Liebman
v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247 (1st Cir. 1945).
70 Bulletin, ABA Section of Taxation, Point 7, p. 69 (Jan. 1962).
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ment-of-premium test' was recently removed when the Supreme Court
sustained its constitutionality." Whether this will result in renewed efforts
by the Treasury to again broaden the basis for the inclusion of life in-
surance proceeds only the future will tell. It is apparent the Government
will continue to deem itself unrestricted by section 2042 when dealing
with life insurance and will seek to treat some transfers of life insurance
within other estate tax provisions such as "transactions in contemplation
of death."
Edward S. Koppman
"Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1955).
72 United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960).
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Federal Aviation Act -- Tariff Deviations -
Setoff Arrangements
In 1962, Northeast Airlines and Sperry Rand Corporation entered into
a forbearance agreement whereby Sperry agreed to accept payment of
Northeast's obligation of $8,554.04 in thirty-six equal monthly install-
ments with interest. Under the agreement, Sperry had an option to
utilize Northeast's transportation at published rates with the charges
being offset against the balance.' The monthly installments were to con-
tinue without regard to the amount of transportation purchased by Sperry.
This arrangement had the practical result of offsetting the monthly pay-
ments in reverse order beginning with the last installment and working
backwards toward the first. The Civil Aeronautics Board reviewed the
forbearance agreement, with the hearing centered on the setoff provision,
which allegedly violated Section 403 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.'
The Board found that the setoff was a tie-in arrangement giving Sperry
advantageous terms in the purchase of transportation, and further, that
it closely resembled a barter transaction since it gave Sperry a strong
incentive to use Northeast to the exclusion of other carriers offering com-
parable service. The Court of Appeals essentially agreed with the Board's
finding. Held: A setoff agreement which cancels the carrier's debts in
exchange for transportation violates sections 403 and 404 of the act by
giving the creditor more advantageous terms in the purchase of trans-
portation than the terms available to the carrier's other customers. North-
east Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662 (1st Cir. 1965).
Sections 403 and 404 of the Federal Aviation Act were intended to
eliminate confusion concerning alleged discriminatory practices by pro-
viding that payment for air transportation be made in accordance with
the tariff filed by each commercial air carrier. Section 403 (a)' permits a
carrier to initially determine its rates and other terms and conditions upon
1 The provision in no way obligated the forbe,.ring creditor to utilize it, but gave the creditor
the option of electing to use Northeast's services. To the extent Northeast's indebtedness was not
discharged by offset, Sperry would be paid in cash with interest.
272 Stat. 758 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964). The pertinent parts of § 403 are set out in
footnotes 3, 5, and 8 infra.
'FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 403(a), 72 Stat. 758 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a)
(1964):
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the Board, and print, and
keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing all rates, fares, and charges for air
transportation . . . and showing to the extent required by regulations of the Board,
all classifications, rules, regulations, practices, and services in connection with such
air transportation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such form and
manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board shall by regulation prescribe;
and the Board is empowered to reject any tariff so filed which is not consistent with
this section and such regulations. Any tariff so rejected shall be void. The rates, fares,
and charges shown in any tariff shall be stated in terms of lawful money of the
United States, but such tariffs may also state rates, fares, and charges in terms of
currencies other than lawful money of the United States. . ..
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which it will offer services to the public, but they must be approved and
embodied in a tariff filed with the Board. Rates filed and subsequently
accepted by the Board as reasonable and non-discriminatory must be
strictly adhered to.4 Section 403 (b)' provides that no carrier shall receive
a "greater or less or different compensation" than the rates appearing in
the tariff. The rate filed is controlling on both carrier and passenger and
is the carrier's sole offer to serve the public.6 Although carriers are pre-
vented from changing a tariff on their own initiative,7 any change which
may become necessary can normally be accomplished by utilizing the
method contained in section 430(c).' Coupled with the provisions of
section 403, section 404(b)' prohibits any undue or unreasonable dis-
crimination by an air carrier resulting from application of its tariff pro-
visions, and publication of the tariff has proved to be an effective safe-
guard against such discrimination. ° Section 403 has not previously been
the subject of judicial construction, but it was taken verbatim from the
Interstate Commerce Act." In reaching the present decision, the court
followed the method the CAB generally uses in interpreting its statutes
if a similar pre-existing statute of the Interstate Commerce Act is involved
and looked to the decisions arising under the pertinent sections of the
older statute and applied their reasoning to the present case."
' See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Mugg, 202 U.S. 242 (1906); Jones v. Northwest Airlines, 157 P.2d
728, 22 Wash.2d 863 (1945). See also Orr, The Law Affecting Aviation Liability, 20 TEMP. L.Q.
64 (1946).
'FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 403(b), 72 Star. 759 (1958), U.S.C. § 1373(b) 1964:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall charge or demand or collect or receive a
greater or less or different compensation for air transportation, or for any service in
connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and charges specified in its currently
effective tariffs; and no air carrier or foreign air carrier shall, in any manner or by
any device, directly or indirectly, or through any agent or broker, or otherwise,
refund or remit any portion of the rates, fares, or charges so specified, or extend to
any person any privileges or facilities, with respect to matters required by the Board
to be specified in such tariffs, except those specified therein ...
6Louisville & N.R.R. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 97 (1915).
'Chicago & A.R.R. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912); see Bills of Lading, 29 I.C.C. 417, 419
(1914).
'FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 403(c), 72 Stat. 759 (1958), 49 U.S.C. S 1373(c)
(1964) :
No change shall be made in any rate, fare, or charge, or any classification, rule, regu-
lation, or practice affecting such rate, fare, or charge . . . except after thirty days'
notice of the proposed change filed, posted, and published in accordance with the
subsection (a) of this section. Such notice shall plainly state the change proposed to
be made and the time such change will take effect. The Board may in the public
interest, by regulation or otherwise, allow such change upon notice less than that here-
in specified, or modify the requirements of this section with respect to fiilng and
posting of tariffs, either in particular instances or by general order applicable to
special or peculiar circumstances or conditions.
"FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b)
(1964).
10 In the Cullom Report, S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1886), it was expressed that
"the chief purpose of any legislation for the regulation of interstate commerce should be to secure
the fullest publicity both as to charges made by common carriers and as to the manner in which
their business is conducted." The Report went on to say that reasonableness and uniformity in
rates could not be secured without publicity "which is the surest and most effective preventative of
unjust discrimination." These principles were adopted by the Supreme Court when called upon to
construe the effect of tariffs filed and published pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act and have
been applied without dissent as to the effect of tariffs on file with the CAB.
"INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT, 34 Stat. 586 (1906), 49 U.S.C. § 6(7) (1964).
a" Markham & Blair, The Effect of Tariff Provisions Filed Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15
J. AIR L. & COM. 251, 259 (1948).
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The cases under the Interstate Commerce Act indicate the strength and
the limitations the courts have placed on provisions identical to those in
question. In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley la the Court declared that,
"the statute manifestly means that the purchase of a transportation ticket
by a passenger and its sale by the company shall be consummated only by
the former paying cash and by the latter receiving cash of the amount
specified in the published tariffs." The statement that transportation is
payable only in cash, unless otherwise specified in the tariff, is the embodi-
ment of the unyielding rule that a carrier cannot vary in any respect
from its filed tariff.4 Gradually this strict rule acquired a degree of
flexibility, allowing reason and good sense to take the place of blind appli-
cation, although the basic purpose of eliminating discrimination involving
carriers was rigidly maintained. The decision that payment by check
satisfied the requirement for "cash"' was indicative of this flexibility."
Though a check is a promise (or order) to pay, the decision does not imply
that any debt can be substituted by the shipper for his indebtedness to
the carrier for the transportation already provided."0 Debts available for
substitution are limited to obligations unconditionally payable on demand
both as a matter of law and as a matter of practical expectation. As the
Supreme Court pointed out," the statutes are not designed to hamper
honest business practices, but to facilitate them. On occasion the courts
have allowed the practice of extending "convenience credit." In Gamble-
Robinson Comm'n Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,5 the court held that
"convenience credit" was not a violation of the statute where the common
practice was for the carrier to allow the transportation charges on credit
to a consignee until the correct amount of indebtedness could be deter-
mined. 9 Allowance of transportation on credit when it is not provided
for in the tariff was narrowly limited by United States v. Hocking Valley
Ry." to credit given only in consideration of the nature of the commodity
'a 2 1 9 U.S. 467, 477 (1911).
14 Id. at 476:
These rates cannot be changed without notice and approval of the authorized agency.
Otherwise, the published schedules would be of no value "if the published rates
could be disregarded in special or particular cases by the acceptance of property of
various kinds, and of such value as the parties immediately concerned chose to put
upon it, in place of money for the service; performed by the carrier."
"Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 520, 522 (1931):
The Interstate Commerce Act does not in terms prescribe that the charges shall be
paid in money; that is, in coin or currency. There is no reason for denying to the
parties the convenience and safety incident: to making payment, in accordance with
the prevailing usuage of business, by means of a check payable on demand drawn on
a going bank in which the drawer has an ample deposit.
1Id. at 521. See also United States v. Hocking Valley Ry., 194 Fed. 234 (N.D. Ohio 1911).
17 See note 15 supra.
's 168 Fed. 161 (8th Cir. 1909).
'9 But see United States v. Hocking Valley Ry., 194 Fed. 234 (N.D. Ohio 1911).20Id. at 250-51.
The statute "cannot be employed to curtail any opportunity to secure to the carrier
its full compensation, and no apparent discrimination which is effectual to accomplish
that end is under the inhibition of that law." The Gamble-Robinson case loses au-
thority "when we consider that here is not an effort to secure payment, as there,
but a granting of a different credit . . . a credit which is not influenced by the
character of the commodity but by a de,:ire to extend a favor . . . a credit, too,
which, the wider it goes, the more is weakened the authority of the law to compel
defendant to treat all its shippers with equality."
But see Passenger Credit Plans Investigation, CAB Order No. E-19197 (16 Jan. 1963), where the
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in order to secure the carrier's full compensation. The Supreme Court
further expanded the area of permissible deviation from a tariff in Chicago
& N.W. Ry. v. Lindell." Having due regard for the perishable nature of
the commodity shipped and the resulting difficulty in ascertaining the
correct transportation charges, the Court held that payment by setting
off a debt fixed by court judgment against the transportation charges was
not "different compensation" prohibited by statute.2 The Court reasoned
that when the debts of both parties had been reduced to judgments, a
court may offset them against each other in order to avoid a multiplicity
of suits. However the parties themselves cannot, by agreement, offset
liquidated debts in order to reduce the indebtedness incurred through the
use of the carrier's services."
In discussing practices that the courts have allowed, it should be noted
that the Interstate Commerce Act does not prohibit the giving of all
preferences and advantages, or the production of all prejudices and dis-
advantages, but only those that are undue and unreasonable.' A carrier
is free to exercise practices ordinarily used by other individuals provided
that any resulting discrimination is not unreasonable.2 In line with this,
it appears that in the area of "group rates" the courts will allow a lower
rate to be charged. Although this may be discrimination in respect to a
single passenger, it is not considered unreasonable, because he is not
similarly circumstanced with the group. Illustrative of the courts' ap-
proach to situations involving not only an alleged violation of the statute
but also the question of unreasonable discrimination is United States v.
Union Pac. R.R.Y There the granting of delayed service to give the ship-
pers additional time to locate markets for their products was found to
constitute the furnishing of additional "privileges or facilities" within the
Board declared that "convenience credit" plans that are included in the tariff are frequently utilized
by surface and air carriers alike and, while they constitute a discrimination, such arrangements are
not unreasonable discriminations as prohibited by statute.
21 281 U.S. 14 (1930).
2
' Id. at 17.
23See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Hoopes & Sons, 233 Fed. 135 (S.D. Iowa 1916).241ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 43 Fed. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1890), aff'd, 145 U.S. 263 (1892).
Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust or
unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue prefer-
ence or disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate
commerce leaves common carriers as they were at common law, free to make special
contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust
and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, and generally to
manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as
sound, and adopted in other trades and pursuits. 43 Fed. at 50-51.
Accord, Gamble-Robinson Comm'n Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., supra note 18.
"s In the dicta of United States v. Wells-Fargo Express, 161 Fed. 606, 610 (N.D. Ill. 1908),
it is suggested that since only unreasonable discrimination violates the statute, the statute is void
for indefiniteness because one cannot know in advance if he is violating the law, and one jury may
find an offense and another nothing reprehensible in their determination of "unreasonable." How-
ever, this view overlooks the fact that it is for the court to first pass on the application of the law
to the facts which the prosecution offers against the defendant. The proper performance of this
duty leaves to the jury no latitude for speculation on the question which is the court's alone. The
court in dealing with the descriptive term "unreasonable" is dealing with a familiar word. Any
contention that carriers will become involved in a maze of complaints stemming from the am-
biguous word "unreasonable" from those who feel as though they are not receiving the same con-
sideration as a competitor is not well-founded.
" ICC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 24.
27 173 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Iowa 1959), aff'd, 362 U.S. 327 (1960).
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meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. While the court held such de-
lays cost the carrier money and consequently must be in the tariff, it
reserved for later consideration whether such a practice was unreasonable.
In Armour Packing Co. v. United States," the Court emphasized that
neither the shipper nor the carrier need be guilty of moral turpitude for
a practice to be illegal. The fact that criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed as requiring a criminal intent has no application when the
general purpose of the legislature is manifest and is subserved by giving
the words used in the statute their ordinary meaning, and thus, covering
the acts charged." Several courts have discussed at length the general pur-
pose of the statute in question." They found that the aim of the statute
is disassociated from any criminal intent, but instead is concerned with
reaching all methods by which a carrier may engage in unlawful dis-
criminations in violation of its tariff.
In the present case, the setoff provision between Northeast and Sperry
must be considered as of the day Sperry accepted the forbearance agree-
ment because it replaced the overdue debt. Since the setoff portion provided
for the cancellation of the indebtedness in reverse order, Sperry's utilization
of Northeast's transportation became a present use of transportation for
cancellation of a debt due in the future. Such an arrangement has a two-
fold basis of illegality. In his concurring opinion Chief Judge Aldrich
recognized that the cases arising under the Interstate Commerce Act in-
volving payment for transportation provide that the cancellation of a
debt by offsetting another debt is limited to the use of "valid checks,
drafts, and money orders."'" Noting that the practice is further limited to
the cancellation of two presently-due debts, and not debts due in the
future, he pointed out that, "a time note is not the equivalent of cash."'"
Judge Aldrich also reasoned that an attempt to offset the transportation
against a future debt was an extension of credit not included in North-
east's tariff and, therefore, a violation of section 403." The opinion of
the court implied that an even stronger basis for holding the present set-
off violative of section 403 may be found in public policy. If the court
had assumed that Northeast's indebtedness was independently acquired,
thus making the setoff other than an exchange or compensation so that
the "greater or less or different" prohibition would be inapplicable, the door
28209 U.S. 56 (1908). The carrier changed its rates but allowed a long-time shipper to con-
tinue under a former contract at the previous rate. The shipper contended there was no intended
violation of the statute but it was held:
While intent is in a certain sense essential to the commission of a crime, and in some
classes of cases it is necessary to show moral turpitude in order to make out a crime,
there is a class of cases within which we think the one under consideration falls,
where purposely doing a thing prohibited by statute may amount to an offense,
although the act does not involve turpitude or moral wrong. In this case the statutes
provide it shall be penal to receive transportation of goods at less than the published
rate. Id. at 85.
29 United States v. P. Koenig Coal Co., 270 U.S. 512, 520 (1926).
s°See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 85 (1908); United States v.
Hocking Valley Ry., supra note 19, at 249.
" Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., supra note 15, at 521.
"aNortheast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 662, 668 (1st Cir., 1965).
'I bid. Accord, United States v. Hocking Valley Ry., supra note 19, at 244.
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for the perpetration of fraud would be opened. A "true barter trans-
action" that clearly violates section 403 could easily be camouflaged by
"arranging" to have the carrier become indebted to the shipper before the
parties entered into such a setoff agreement.' No barter or exchange would
ever be prohibited by section 403 and its purpose would be defeated. Even
if the court had found nothing illegal in the particular arrangement be-
tween Northeast and Sperry, it would have been necessary, as a policy
matter, to rule against it in order to safeguard the purpose of section 403
from the dangers of fraud. 5 Had the court in Northeast undertaken the
evaluation of the evidence in order to determine whether a tie-in arrange-
ment was actually involved, the result would be that each similar setoff
agreement would have to come under court scrutiny before it could be
said that the agreement was not a violation of section 403. Such a pro-
cedure would be too lengthy and costly to justify its use. The court's
heavy reliance on Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottleyas is not particularly
suited to this case, although the expressions of statutory purpose found
within the decision form a strong policy basis for the present holding.
In Mottley, the attempted setoff involved the exchange of transportation
passes for an unliquidated damage claim. The basis of any valid setoff
arrangement is the counter-balancing of two or more liquidated claims
and can in no matter involve the setoff of an unliquidated claim. 7 This
was pointed out in Lindell, where, prior to litigation, the shipper's un-
liquidated claim could not lawfully be used as a setoff. Furthermore, the
Court in Union Pac. Ry v. Goodridge,"8 looking at an unliquidated claim
merely as contractual consideration rather than as a part of a setoff
declared,
There is no doubt of the general proposition that the release of an un-
liquidated claim for damages is a good consideration for a promise, as between
the parties, and if no one else were interested in the transaction, that rule
might apply here; but the legislature, upon grounds of public policy, and
for the protection of third parties, has made certain requirements with
84 While this would certainly be true where the carrier offered only transportation, here North-
east gave Sperry an option to receive only money or a combination of money and transportation
in satisfaction. Although this type of arrangement is further removed from a barter where only
transportation is offered, still it is a barter and could easily lend itself to fraud by merely giving
"lip service" to a provision giving the shipper an option.
85See United States v. Louisville Bridge Co., 233 Fed. 270, 276 (W.D. Ky. 1916), where the
court stated:
While in many instances Congress, had it seen fit to do so, might have ameliorated
and softened some apparently harsh results . . . many instances of the ruthless
results of legislation under the commerce clause of the Constitution have appeared
where the courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have found no power to avoid
them. The case of Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley . . . is one of the most
striking of these.
3Supra note 13.
87 WATERMAN, SETOFFS AND COUNTERCLAIMS 334 (1872):
The reason why a setoff is only permitted to be exercised where the demands are
fixed and ascertained by the admission of the parties, by judgment, or something
equivalent, rendering equally certain the right and the amount, is obvious. "Were the
exercise more general, as the proceeding is of a summary nature, the parties would
be deprived of the ordinary modes for the trial of controverted claims, and of the
established methods of review and redress for error."
ss149 U.S. 680 (1893).
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regard to equality of rates which, in their practical application would be
rendered nugatory, if this rule were given full effect.'9
Public policy occupied a similarly irportant position in Mottley and for
this reason the case is a particularly apt precedent for the present case.
The basis for the Mottley decision was the presumption of the opportunity
for fraud, and this same presumption prevents Chicago, I. & L. Ry. v.
United States" from being distinguished away. There the carrier had in-
duced the shipper to occupy the position of the carrier's creditor by offer-
ing the exchange of its transportation for advertising. Sperry quite possibly
already occupied the position of a Northeast creditor before any mention
of the setoff was made. In such a situation the inducement would be
lacking and hence no barter. Had the court upheld the setoff, the danger
of fraud in similar subsequent transactions by covering up an actual in-
ducement situation is so apparent that public policy behind the statute
"forced" the court to recognize this factor.
In Northeast, the court indicates disapproval of any arrangement be-
tween air carrier and shipper providing for the use of setoffs of liquidated
debts in exchange for transportation. And while the basis for the decision
is a violation of section 403, underlying is the court's fear of fraud being
perpetrated against the purpose of the statute. The court wishes to re-
main steadfast to the "purpose of Congress .. . to cut up by the roots
every form of discrimination, favoritism and inequality."'" Actually the
court is prohibiting formalized arrangements that evade, or make avail-
able avenues to evade, the purpose of section 403. The writer believes,
however, that as a practical matter, the practice of bartering goes on
between air carriers and' their customers under an unwritten mutual
reciprocity agreement. Suppliers to the air carrier will find that the
carrier's need for their particular product will decrease markedly should
the supplier choose to utilize the transportation of the carrier's com-
petitor. Such informal "understandings" or quasi-barters are, however,
outside the scope of the CAB's authority. Therefore, while the CAB can
control formalized bartering originating from either the carrier or the
shipper, reciprocal business considerations will prevent a form of barter
by means of a setoff arrangement from being completely extinguished.
Charles J. McGuire
a1 Id. at 691.
40219 U.S. 486 (1911). Decided the same day as Mottley, it combines with Mottley to form
the basis of the court's decision in Northeast.
"' Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 478 (1911). In Northeast the court states
that:
An interpretation of the statute which adopts, in effect, a rule of per se illegality
.. . is defensible on the basis that it is essential to the statutory scheme of compre-
hensive regulation to preclude any possibility of integrated transactions being accom-
plished by being broken into ostensibly independent steps and, furthermore, to pre-
clude saddling the Board with the necessity of policing or examining such business
dealings between carriers and customers in order to ascertain whether a disguised
step-transaction is or is not being effectuated by a carrier in any case in which an
outright cash or check payment is not used. 345 F.2d at 667.
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Administrative Law - Judicial Review - Waterman Doctrine
Petitioners, American Airlines, Trans World Airlines, and Pan American
World Airways, challenged the Civil Aeronautics Board's issuance of
certificates of public convenience and necessity' authorizing Saturn Air-
ways and Capitol Airways to institute international "split charter" flights.'
The certificates had been approved by the President pursuant to Federal
Aviation Act provisions requiring presidential approval of certificates of
public convenience and necessity dealing with overseas or foreign air
transportation.' The CAB action was contested by petitioners, first, as
transgressing statutory authority and, second, as being invalid for lack of
findings. The CAB contended that it had acted within its statutory
authority in aproving the "split charter" flights, and that the court was
precluded from any further review by the Waterman doctrine.4 The
Supreme Court held in Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp.' that orders issued by the Board which are subject to presidential
approval embody an element of political decision, and a review by the
courts would amount to an infringement of exclusive presidential authority
in dealing with foreign affairs. Held: The courts may review a CAB order
which has been approved by the President where the challenge is that the
order exceeds statutory authority. Further, the Federal Aviation Act of
1958" authorized the CAB to evolve a definition of the term "charter
trips" to conform with the changing needs of the aircraft industry, and
the Board did not transgress the perimeter of its statutory authority by
promulgating a definition which includes "split charter" flights. American
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In the Waterman case, the petitioner alleged that a CAB order denying
him a certificate of public convenience and necessity was issued without
the support of substantial evidence. The majority' admittedly held, con-
'Transatlantic Charter Investigation, CAB Order Nos. E-20530 & 20531 (24 Feb. 1964).
'A "split charter" occurs when two eligible groups each charter half of a plane's capacity.
'FEDERAL AvIATION ACT OF 1958, § 801, 72 Stat. 782 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964):
The issuance, denial, transfer, amendment, cancellation, suspension, or revocation of,
and the terms, conditions, and limitations contained in, any certificate authorizing
air carrier to engage in overseas or foreign air transportation, or air transportation
between places in the same Territory or possession, or any permit issuable to any
foreign air carrier under section 1372 of this title, shall be subject to the approval
of the President.
4 Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
Ibid. For an interesting discussion of the system of presidential approval of CAB orders, see
generally Calkins, Acquisition of Operating Authority by Foreign Air Carriers: The Role of the
CAB, White House, and Department of State, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 65 (1965).
'FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 101, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
'Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., supra note 4, at 110: "It may be conceded
that a literal reading of § 1006 subjects this order to re-examination by the courts."
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trary to the literal language of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,'
that section 1006 of the act exempted from judicial review all orders
granting or denying applications of citizen airlines to engage in overseas
and foreign air transportation. The decision that such orders are not
amenable to review followed from their being subject to presidential
approval under the Civil Aeronautics Act.' As a consequence, such orders
are not reviewable prior to presidential approval because they are not
final and, after presidential action, they are beyond judicial inquiry since
they embody presidential discretion Ls to international affairs.
Four justices' ° in Waterman joined in a vigorous dissent, protesting that
the majority decision left no remedy for "lawless" action by the CAB,
that is, even for action whereby the CAB violated the Civil Aeronautics
Act itself." They reasoned that presidentially approved CAB action author-
izing domestic carriers to engage in foreign air transportation should be
subject to review as long as the matter to be reviewed could be divorced
from any substantial element of presidential discretion. It seems that the
dissenting view is not dissimilar to that expressed in a much-cited case,
Banco De Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank." In Banco the court held that
although the State Department has the power to make final determinations
in foreign policy matters, the courts retain power to determine property
questions provided they do not affect the international or diplomatic re-
lations of the Government. At present, the Federal Aviation Act, which
was enacted subsequent to Banco and Waterman, expressly excludes cer-
tificates of public convenience and necessity from the domain of property
rights," a practice not uncommon in federal licensing. 4 It appears that
the Banco decision, which was concerned exclusively with the deprivation
of property rights, would not be considered controlling in cases involving
such certificates. Banco indicated, however, that there are instances in the
field of foreign affairs in which discretionary elements can be validly
separated from personal rights so that a judicial determination can be made
'The provisions of § 1006 originally appeared in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
1024 (1938), (now FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF' 1958, 72 Stat. 795 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1486
(1964):
Any order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board under this Act, except any
order in respect of any foreign air carrier subject to the approval of the President
as provided in section 801 of this Act, shall be subject to review by the circuit
courts of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upon petition . . . . (Emphasis added.)
'Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, § 801, 52 Stat. 1014 (now FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958,
§ 801, 72 Stat. 782 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964), supra note 3).
l" Justices Douglas, Black, Reed, and Rutledge.
"333 U.S. at 118:
[N]o matter how extreme the action of the Board, the courts are powerless to correct
it under today's decision ....
Judicial review would assure the President, the litigants and the public that the
Board had acted within the limits of its authority. It would carry out the aim of
Congress to guard against administrative action which exceeds statutory bounds.
(Emphasis added.)
12 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940).
"FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, §401(i), 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(i)
(1964): "No certificate shall confer any proprietary, property, or exclusive right in the use of
any air space, civil airway, landing area, or air-navigation facility."
14See, e.g., COMMUNICATIONS ACTS, 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1964).
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as to whether there has been an unconstitutional deprivation. Yet, the
Court in Waterman did not consider the constitutional question in arriv-
ing at its decision. Perhaps the reasoning is that the right to engage in
overseas and foreign air transportation, being within the President's
authority in dealing with foreign affairs, is not so fundamental a right as
to be protected by the Constitution. 5
The majority view in Waterman has remained essentially unquestioned
where the action of the CAB has been challenged for arbitrariness or lack
of substantial evidence." However, no reported case has held Waterman
controlling where the action of the Board was challenged for lack of
statutory power. In addition to the instant decision, one recent case adds
force to the proposition that the courts should not and will not abdicate
their judicial responsibility to review Board action which transgresses
statutory authority. In Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc.7 the court was faced with a situation in which the CAB might have
been acting in contravention of the Federal Aviation Act. The Board was
in the process of terminating a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity previously granted to Pan American. The act provides that such
certificates can be revoked only for failure to comply with an order, rule,
regulation, term, condition, or limitation issued by the Board."8 Pan
American had not so failed, and the district court" handed down a de-
claratory judgment in favor of Pan American limiting the CAB to action
within the terms of the Federal Aviation Act. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit' vacated the district court decision,
the basis of the ruling being that the CAB order was not final and, there-
fore, not reviewable, since it was still subject to presidential approval.
Nevertheless, the court suggested" that the order would be reviewable
once issued by the Board and approved by the President.
In the present case, petitioner contended that the Federal Aviation Act
did not authorize the CAB to issue certificates of public convenience and
necessity for "split charter" flights. The court held that Waterman should
be restricted to situations where the order is challenged for lack of sub-
stantial evidence or procedural due process. Hence, even though the ju-
diciary cannot transgress the bounds of presidential authority by reviewing
a particular CAB order which may or may not have been supported by
154 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 5 28.19 (1958).
16 See, e.g., Great Lakes Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 229 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1956); United States
Overseas Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 222 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
17321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"
8
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 401(g), 72 Stat. 754 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g)
(1964).
1"Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1962).
2°Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 321 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
" Id. at 396:
Whether the President has statutory or constitutional authority to terminate Pan
American's route authorization for reasons of public convenience and necessity is quite
a different question from the one . . . [raised] in Waterman. That case neither settles
nor illuminates more than faintly the issues which would face a court reviewing the
authority of the Board or the President in this case to terminate Pan American's
route authorization.
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sufficient evidence, the judiciary can still validly review an order allegedly
issued without statutory "power." The court interpreted Waterman as
"clearly presupposing" lawful and congressionally authorized Board action
"as an indispensible predicate, without which there is nothing Presidential
action can approve." 2 Judge Burger distinguished United States Overseas
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,' in which petitioner had unsuccessfully sought re-
view of CAB action on the basis of an alleged violation of procedural due
process. He reasoned that a decision. to review an order challenged for
lack of statutory "power" was not inconsistent with a refusal to review for
lack of procedural due process. 4 The basis for the distinction was that
allegations of denial of procedural clue process go to the correctness of
an award to a particular party rather than to the statutory "power" to
issue the order. Pursuant to section 801," CAB orders involving overseas
and foreign air transportation are subject to approval by the President,
and he must be free to consider all evidentiary matters, including a denial
of procedural due process, and must be free to exercise unreviewable dis-
cretion concerning the relative weight: to be given each evidentiary factor.
The Waterman decision is still very much in force, although its effect
is certainly not as broad in scope as the dissenting opinion therein seems
to surmise. It seems that as the law presently stands there is no judicial
remedy for action by the CAB in respect to foreign air carriers or citizen
air carriers engaging in overseas or foreign air transportation so long as
the Board does not violate the provisions of the Federal Aviation Act.
However, if the CAB acts in contravention of the statute and the order
is approved by the President, the judiciary may hold the order void since
it is a nullity when it reaches the President, and there is, in effect, nothing
for him to approve. Although the court in American Airlines clearly
stated that the President could not by his approval validate invalid orders
issued by the Board," it seems to contradict itself by hinting"' that there
might be situations in which a CAB order issued without statutory power
could be validated through presidential approval. The implication is that if
the President should approve a particular CAB order on the basis of foreign
policy considerations, the court may refuse to determine whether the
CAB acted outside the perimeter of statutory authority. With all due
respect for the broad discretion which is properly accorded the President
in dealing with foreign affairs, it is still difficult to visualize circumstances
2American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 348 F.2d 349, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23222 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
24 The orders in dispute in USOA had not been approved by the President so the holding of
the case could have been restricted to the proposition that they were not reviewable since they
were not final. This was the basis in Waterman for holding that orders still subject to presidential
action were unreviewable. However, the court in USOA clearly indicated that even had the orders
already been approved, the court would still have refused review, the reasoning being that the
President should be free to exercise unreviewable discretion in dealing with procedural due process.
In somewhat the same vein, the statement in British Overseas Airways Corp. v. CAB, 304 F.2d 952
(1962), in regard to unavailability of review "now or later" can be considered dictum. The
American Airlines court restricts BOAC to the holding that the orders were not reviewable because
they had not been acted upon by the President and thus, were not final.
2 5 FEDERAL AVIATioN ACT OF 1958, § 801, 72 Stat. 782 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964).
20 348 F.2d at 352.
2 7id. n.2.
[Vol. 32
1966] CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS 131
which would authorize the courts to refuse to review CAB action which
allegedly violates the terms of the Federal Aviation Act. It is one thing
for a court to refuse to review an act of discretion exercised under the
statute, for such discretionary act is by its nature a political action; how-
ever, it is quite another thing, and perhaps an abdication of the judicial
process, to refuse to review not the action but the scope of the statute
itself. As of now this question has not been directly encountered by the
courts. Consequently, it remains to be decided whether the President can,
by his approval of an invalid CAB order, change the black to white.
Michael M. Wade
Chattel Mortgages - Federal Aviation Act
Federal Recordation
Plaintiff, Texas National Bank of Houston, loaned a retail aircraft dealer,
Cummings and Groves (Cummings), ninety per cent of the purchase
price of all aircraft which it purchased. In exchange, the bank obtained a
personal sixty-day note and a floor plan chattel mortgage on each aircraft.
The mortgages were filed for record with the county clerk of Harris
County, Texas, and recorded with the Federal Aviation Agency in Okla-
homa City pursuant to the provisions of Section 503 of the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958.' Subsequently, Cummings sold one of the aircraft to
the defendants, Calvin Aufderheide and John McCauley, and allowed
them to take possession and remove it to their residence in Arkansas.
Cummings deposited the defendants' check with the plaintiff bank, but
did not direct payment of its obligation out of the proceeds. Unable to
collect on the note, the bank brought suit to regain possession of the air-
craft. Held: The mortgage was inoperative under the general rule that
mortgages on chattels exposed to daily retail sale are void, and recordation
with the FAA will not validate a mortgage inherently invalid. Texas
Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (D. Ark. 1964).
The complexity involved in determining the validity of aircraft con-
veyances has long been recognized by Congress. In 1938 it enacted title
V of the Civil Aeronautics Act' establishing a national recording system
for all instruments affecting title to or interest in domestic civil aircraft.
In so doing, Congress clearly preempted the field of conveyancing of
interest in aircraft to facilitate the control and promotion of air com-
merce. Congress felt that the recordation provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act were definitely within the proper application of federal law
in a field of federal competence.' These provisions were substantially re-
enacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,' plus the addition of a new
1 72 Stat. 772 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
'Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, §§ 501-05, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
'Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 296 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1961); United
States v. United Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1948).4 Continental Radio Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 369 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1963) error ref. n.r.e.5 FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958, § 503 (a)-(d), 72 Stat. 772 (1958), 49 U.S.C. 5 1403
(a)-(d) (1964). The following are the pertinent sections of the act:
(a) The Administrator shall establish and maintain a system for the recording of
each and all of the following:
(1) Any conveyance which affects the title to or an interest in any civil aircraft
of the United States. ...
(b) The Administrator shall also record under the system provided for in Section (a)
of this section any release, cancellation, discharge or satisfaction relating to any con-
veyance or other instrument recorded under said system.
(c) No conveyance or instrument, the recording of which is provided for by Section
503 (a) shall be valid in respect to such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, propellers,
appliances or spare parts against any person other than the person by whom the con-
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section concerning the issuance of dealers' aircraft registration certificates
by the Administrator.' The reenacted provisions provide that no convey-
ance or instrument affecting aircraft will be valid unless filed for recorda-
tion in accordance with the specific procedure enumerated in the act,
except as to parties to the instrument or persons with actual knowledge of
its existence. Consequently, to determine whether there is a valid encum-
brance on any aircraft, it is only necessary to check the central file in
Oklahoma City. This federal registration requirement is applicable to all
civil aircraft including those operating intrastate as well as interstate.7
When an instrument is filed for recordation under section 503 of the act,
all persons are deemed to have notice of its existence and its effect on the
title to the property concerned.
Although the existing law had assisted materially in facilitating the
recordation of security instruments, it did not determine their substantive
validity; to determine this, one still had to look to the state statutes. The
courts, in attempting to apply the proper state law, were faced with de-
termining which state law should be applied. Apparently some courts
chose to apply the law of the state in which the property was located.
Other courts chose the state in which the parties resided, or in which the
instrument was executed and delivered. In order to alleviate the problem,
Congress amended the Federal Aviation Act.8 The new provision, section
506, provides a uniform federal rule that the validity of instruments
affecting tide to or interest in aircraft is to be governed by the law of the
state in which the documents are delivered, irrespective of the location, or
the place of delivery, of the property covered. If a place of delivery is
designated in the instrument, there is a presumption that the instrument
was delivered at the place so specified. As a result of section 506, the courts
are now able to apply a uniform rule in determining the substantive
validity of such instruments.
In Aufderheide the court did not base its holding on the common or
statutory law of Texas, but on a general and, the court thought, salutary
veyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or devisee, or any person having
actual notice thereof, until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recorda-
tion in the office of the Administrator ...
(d) Each conveyance or other instrument recorded by means of or under the system
provided for in sub-sections (a) or (b) of this section shall from the time of its
filing for recordation be valid as to all persons without further or other recordation,
except that an instrument pursuant to Section 503 (a) (3) shall be effective only with
respect to those of such items which may from time to time be situated at the desig-
nated location or locations and only while so situated; provided, that an instrument
recorded under Section 503 (a) (2) shall not be affected as to the engine or engines,
or propeller or propellers, specifically identified therein, by any instrument theretofore
or thereafter recorded, pursuant to Section 503 (a) (3) ....
OFEDERAL AVIATioN ACT OF 1958, § 505, 72 Stat. 744, 49 U.S.C. § 1405 (1958).
"Blalock v. Brown, 78 Ga. App. 537, 51 S.E.2d 610 (1949). See Annot., 9 A.L.R. 2d 476
(1949) for a discussion of this area.
8 FEDERAL AvIATION ACT OF 1958, § 506, 78 Stat. 236, 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964):
The validity of any instrument the recording of which is provided for by Section
503 of this act shall be governed by the laws of the State, District of Columbia, or
territory or possession of the United States in which such instrument is delivered,
irrespective of the location of place of delivery of the property which is subject to
such instrument. Where the place of intended delivery of such instrument is specified
therein, it shall constitute presumptive evidence that such instrument was delivered
at the place so specified.
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principle of law which it felt should be given recognition in applying
section 5 03.! The court felt that where there is no agreement to the con-
trary, consent to sell mortgaged property consisting of a stock of goods is
implied when the mortgagor is permited to remain in possession of the
property and such property is daily exposed and offered for sale by the
mortgagor in the ordinary course of business.1" In support of this proposi-
tion, the court cited Section 9-307 of the Uniform Commercial Code,"5
although Texas did not adopt the Code until after the Aufderheide de-
cision."2 The court further reasoned that a purchaser should be able to rely
on a dealer's right to sell an aircraft and should not be required to make
a search of the records before purchasing the aircraft. Further, the court
pointed out that a purchaser need not determine whether a merchant has
obtained a valid release of the item from a bank floor plan before accept-
ing delivery. The requirement of consent is waived if the mortgagee
knowingly permits the violation of the floor plan chattel mortgage provi-
sion prohibiting removal of mortgaged aircraft by authorized dealers with-
out the mortgagee's written consent." In Aufderbeide, the plaintiff bank
had allowed the mortgagor to retain possession of the aircraft which the
bank knew would be daily exposed for sale in the course of the mortgagor's
business. Monies received by the mortgagor upon sale of the aircraft were
deposited to its own account, to be applied later in settlement with the
bank. Under such circumstances the court found that the mortgagor had
at least the implied consent of the bank to sell the aircraft notwithstand-
ing the prohibition contained in the mortgage. When the defendants pur-
chased the aircraft, the bank was estopped to assert any rights which it
had under the mortgage.
Although Congress preempted the recordation of aircraft conveyances,
it provided that state law should be controlling as to the substantive
validity of any security instrument. Under section 503, the court should
have applied Texas law. It would have arrived at virtually the same de-
cision, because Texas has a statutory provision similar to the general
principle of property law cited in support of the court's position."' The
mortgage existing between the plaintiff and Cummings was inoperative and
considered to be fraudulent in law.' When the defendant purchased in
Sechrist-Hall Co. v. Harlingen Nat'l Bank, 368 S.W.2d 1 5 (Tex. Civ. Apo. 1963) error ref.
n.r.e. Donohue Inv. Co. v. H. E. McMasters Co., 301 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Civ, App. 1957).
"
0 See generally 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 262(6) (1939).
" It can be seen from § 9-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code that the Code does not apply
to any transaction which is subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such
statute governs the rights of parties affected by tansactions in particular types of property. Filing
under 49 U.S.C. § 1401-05 (calling for the registration of the title to, and liens upon, aircraft
with the Federal Aviation Agency) is recognized as the equivalent to filing under § 9-302 of
the Code.
" The Code will become effective 1 July 1966. Vernon's Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 721 (1965).
" Texas Nat'l Bank v. Aufderheide, 235 F. Supp. 599 (D. Ark. 1964). See generally 15 Am.
Jur. 2d Chattel Mortgages § 155 (1964).
" TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4000 (1949): "Every mortgage . . . daily exposed to sale
. . . in the regular course of business of such merchandise, and contemplating a continuance of the
possession of said goods by said owner, shall be deemed fraudulent and void.
"
5 A. Peiser & Co. v. Peticolas, 50 Tex. 638 (:1879):
Fraud in Law is defined to be such acts or contracts as, although not originating in
any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a positive fraud upon other per-
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good faith and for a valuable consideration, he took title to the aircraft
and cut off the bank's lien. The mere fact that the plaintiff had registered
the mortgage agreement under federal requirements did not make it valid."6
Aufderheide demonstrates two significant points in connection with the
federal preemption of the recordation of aircraft security documents.
First, state statutes are to govern the original validity of mortgages and
various other instruments pertaining to aircraft. Second, the federal act
apparently does not attempt to affect the validity of these instruments,
but was intended to furnish a central location where claims of liens could
be filed. Therefore, filing wih the FAA in compliance with section 503 (c)
of the act is essential if a valid instrument is to constitute notice to subse-
quent purchasers and creditors. However, filing will accord no validity to
an instrument invalid under state law. As long as the state law controls
the substantive validity of mortgage instruments, recordation of these
instruments, although federally controlled, will afford mortgagees little
security. In order to protect banks and other financial institutions con-
cerned with the financing of aircraft from future losses which might be
sustained in light of this court's ruling, further legislation is required.
Amendment of the Federal Aviation Act to provide for a uniform federal
rule controlling the substantive validity of security instruments should
be made. Upon default of a merchant, banks and other financing institu-
tions should be able to look to the retail purchaser for repossession of the
chattel. Any purchaser who wished to afford himself protection against
this repossession could do so by merely placing a call to the central office
in Oklahoma City prior to the purchase thereby ascertaining any encum-
brances outstanding on the chattel.
Ben J. Kerr III
sons, or to violate private or public competence, or to impair or injure the public in-
terests, deemed equally reprehensible with positive fraud, and therefore are prohibited
by law as within reasons as acts done mala animo.
'OSee Aircraft Inv. Corp. v. Pezzoni & Reid Equip. Co., 205 F. Supp. 80, 82 (E.D. Mich.
1962) where the court stated:
In providing for the recordation of various instruments pertaining to transactions
affecting title or interest in aircraft, Congress has not impaired the existence and
effectiveness of state laws creating and defining such instruments. . . . Thus if the
purported chattel mortgage is void as to defendant under the appropriate state law,
federal recording will not save it. Even if defendant had notice of plaintiff's mortgage,
it may still be able to show reliance on conduct by the plaintiff amounting to a
waiver of the mortgage lien. . ..
Accord, Production Credit Ass'n v. Mahan, 168 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). See
generally 12 Tex. Jur. 2d Chattel Mortgages § 37 (1960).
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RECENT DECISIONS
LABOR LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-
INFORMATIONAL PICKETING
In October 1965, mechanics represented by Air Transport Local 512, a
labor organization within the Railway Labor Act, began an economic
strike against their employer, Chicago Helicopter Airways. The company
leases space from the City of Chicago in the terminal building at O'Hare
International Airport where it maintains a passenger service counter.
Seeking to inform the public of the labor dispute, the union placed one
picket in the vicinity of Helicopter's counter, utilizing a body "sandwich
type" sign rather than a placard. The city has the policy of not authorizing
pickets, solicitors, peddlers or hawkers, and others not having business at
the airport, within the confines of the terminal building. The union picket
was escorted from the building by Chicago police, but he would have
been permitted to picket on the sidewalk outside the entrances to the
building. Contending that they were exercising a constitutional privilege
of free speech, the union sought to enjoin the interference by the City.
Held: The terminal is an extremely important public facility. The interest
of the public in efficient transportation outweighs the picket's exercise of
his right to free speech within the confines of the building. Nelson ex rel.
Air Transport Local 512, TWU v. City of Chicago, 9 Av. L. REP. 17,878
(N.D. Ill. 21 Oct. 1965).
In reaching its decision, the court merely weighed the respective rights
and interests, that of the labor union to engage in informational picketing
and of the city to manage the airport. Although the union argued that
picketing outside the terminal would be ineffective because Helicopter's
passengers might never go outside the building, the court found this to
be outweighed by the "rights of others to have unimpeded access to trans-
portation and other airport facilities." Although informational picketing
is often permitted at a "common situs" such as the exterior of stores in a
shopping center, the decision shows the inapplicability of that doctrine
to ticket counters in a congested airport terminal building.
J.E.M.
WARSAW CONVENTION-LIMITATION ON LIABILITY-
NOTICE TO PASSENGERS
During 1961 Flying Tiger Lines entered into a "call contract" with the
United States Military Air Transport Service (MATS) to provide trans-
portation for government personnel. In early 1962, MATS issued a service
order to Flying Tiger requesting air transportation for ninety-nine persons
from Travis Air Force Base, California, to Saigon, Vietnam. The passengers
were selected by MATS and each was given a MATS boarding pass and
claim check. At the foot of the boarding ramp the passengers were given
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a boarding ticket by a Flying Tiger stewardess, and were instructed to
write their boarding ticket numbers on their claim checks. The front of
this boarding ticket stated that the transportation was subject to the lia-
bility limitations of the Warsaw Convention, and other conditions of the
Convention were printed on the back of the ticket in very fine print. The
MATS boarding pass, however, contained no mention of the Convention
or the liability limitation. After the boarding tickets were issued, the
servicemen were required to board the plane immediately and were not
given an opportunity to read the ticket and return to the terminal to pur-
chase flight insurance. The plane vanished enroute to Vietnam and the
personal representatives of the passengers sought recovery under the Death
on the High Seas Act. The lower court held that the Warsaw Convention
was applicable and that sufficient notice of the liability limitation had been,
given to the passengers.' Held, reversed and remanded: delivery of the
passenger ticket was not made sufficiently in advance of the flight to allow
passengers adequate time to purchase additional insurance. Warren v. Fly-
ing Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
Article 3 of the Warsaw Convention requires delivery of a ticket and
provides that failure to deliver a ticket results in a waiver of liability
limitation by the carrier. In holding that Flying Tiger did not give ade-
quate notice, the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on Mertens v. Flying Tiger
Line, Inc.' where the passenger ticket was delivered to Mertens after he
had boarded the plane. The Second Circuit held that delivery of the ticket
under these circumstances was insufficient and the damages limitation of
the Warsaw Convention was inapplicable. The holding by the Ninth
Circuit in Warren appears to be a logical extension of Mertens and that
airlines must now give notice of the Convention's applicability in the form
of a passenger or boarding ticket sufficiently in advance of the flight to
allow passengers to make allowances for the liability limitation. It would
seem that further extension of the notice requirements established in
Warren would not be in line with Article 3 of the Convention, which
merely requires "delivery." However, situations where Mertens and Warren
will be applied will depend largely upon the facts in each case.
E.A.P.
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT-CAB AUTHORITY OVER HAWAII-
INTERISLAND FLIGHTS
In August 1961, Island Airlines, Inc. (Island) secured an order from the
Public Utilities Commission of Hawaii fixing its rates for flights between
the major islands of Hawaii. Without securing a certificate of convenience
and necessity from the Civil Aeronautics Board authorizing it to engage
in air transportation, and without attempting to comply with Section
401 (a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Island began carrying pas-
' Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 234 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
2 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965).
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sengers between the major islands. When Island persisted in its flights after
notification by the CAB that it was operating in violation of section
401 (a), the CAB filed a complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction. Held: Injunction granted; the flights were in inter-
state commerce subject to the authority of the CAB. Island was required
to get a federal certificate of convenience and necessity. Island Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 352 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1965).
The boundaries of a state are determined by Congress, and not by in-
ternational law. Of course, Congress is not precluded, in creating the
boundaries, from following and adopting international law. Where Con-
gress has failed to delineate the boundaries with certainty, the courts must
define them and in doing so they may apply international law. Since Con-
gress had not established the channels between the islands of Hawaii as
being within the boundaries of the state, it remained for the court to
determine whether Hawaii had acquired these channels as historic waters
acquired by prescription. In determining whether a state has acquired an
historic title to a maritime area under international law, at least three
factors are considered: (1) the exercise of authority over the area by the
state claiming the historic right, (2) a continuity of this exercise of
authority, and (3) the attitude of foreign states. The nation of Hawaii
had not exercised such continuing sovereignty and, therefore, had not
established a prescriptive historical right to the interisland channels. When
the islands were ceded to the United States, no right to the waters beyond
the traditional three-mile limit was transferred, nor has the United States
claimed such rights. It follows that when Island flew over the channels
it was compelled to fly outside the state's boundaries and over the high
seas, thereby engaging in "interstate air commerce" within the meaning of
the Federal Aviation Act. This case provides a definitive ruling on the
question of sovereignty over the interisland channels of Hawaii and the
regulation of flights over them.
L.M.F.
CONFLICT OF LAWS--LEX LOCI THEORY-
DAMAGES LIMITATION
Plaintiff's decedent was a passenger aboard defendant's aircraft which
crashed in Missouri during a flight from Oklahoma to Indiana. The evi-
dence indicated that the proximate cause of the accident was the result of
negligence occurring solely in Missouri. Missouri has a statutory limitation
of $25,000 in wrongful death actions; however, the Oklahoma district
court in which the action was brought entered judgment for $250,000.
Defendant's argument on appeal was that the Missouri statute limiting
liability was controlling. Held: Judgment affirmed, on condition that plain-
tiff enter a remittitur of $225,000. The substantive law of the place where
the injury occurred (lex loci) governs the amount of damages awarded in
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a suit instituted in a "foreign" jurisdiction. Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v.
Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (Okla. 1965).
The substantive rights of parties in a tort action have normally been
governed by the law of the place where the injury occurred or where the
wrong causing that injury was committed. This traditional rule, or lex loci
theory, is the result of an extended parade of cases from many jurisdictions.
Substantive rights have always been distinguished from procedural matters
which are controlled by the law of the forum in which the action is insti-
tuted (lex fori). According to adherents to the lex loci theory, damages
are considered to be a substantive "right," and thus subject to the lex loci.
This case is among the majority when one considers the sheer number of
opinions in this field, but does not reflect the significant trend toward
"tavoiding" or overruling the lex loci rule in favor of a yet unresolved
replacement.
For a discussion of the new trend, see Note, 31 J. AIR L. & COM. 275
(1965), discussing Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc.
J.T.L.
